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The following material represents the completion of the article begun
in the.Summer, 1976, issue of the IndianaLaw Journal.Appendices listing
terms and formulas used are. included at the end of this article.
The first part of this article included material concerning (1) how
defendants and prosecutors perceive the probability of a conviction and the
sentence that will be received from a conviction, (2) how defendants and
prosecutors implicitly use that information in order to determine their
respective bargaining limits, and (3) how those bargaining limits are
adjusted for non-sentence goals.'
The model views the plea bargaining process as analagous to a
buying/selling transaction in a market that has no fixed prices, much like
that of a push-cart peddler. The defense counsel or defendant is the buyer
seeking as low a price, charge, or sentence as possible. The prosecutor is a
seller seeking as high a price, charge, or sentence as possible within the
constraints imposed by the criminal statute and possibly his sense of
equity. Each has in mind a rough notion of how high or low tie is willing
to go before breaking off negotiations and turning to the trial alternative.
How high the defendant-buyer is willing to go depends on his
perception of the probability of his being convicted and the sentence he is
likely to receive if he is convicted. How low the prosecutor-seller is willing
to go also depends on his perception of the conviction probability and the
likely sentence. By multiplying each party's perception of the conviction
*Professor of political science at the University of Illinois and member of the Illinois

bar.
IND.

**Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois.
'Nagel'& Neef, Plea Bargaining,Decision Theory, and Equilibrium Models: PartI, 52
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probability times the likely sentence, one can obtain the expected value of
going to trial for either. Those expected values represent the upper
bargaining limit of the defendant and the lower bargaining limit of the
prosecutor before adjustments are made for other considerations. They are
the outside limits in the sense that if the other side will not go that far that
limit is the expected value that can be achieved by turning to the trial
alternative.
The defendant's upper limit needs to be adjusted for such non-sentence
goals as getting out of jail while awaiting trial, avoiding the cost of hiring
an attorney, and waiving the due process safeguards associated with a jury
trial. Those non-sentence goals generally result in the defendant-buyer's
being willing to offer a bonus above his base price or unadjusted limit for
early delivery of the product or resolution of the case. The prosecutor's
lower limit needs to be adjusted for such non-sentence goals as conserving
his litigation resources, preserving his high conviction percentage, and
waiving the use of the defendant as an example to others. Those nonsentence goals generally result in the prosecutor-seller's being willing to
offer a discount below his base price or unadjusted limit for early payment
on the invoice or resolution of the case.
Where the defendant-buyer has a choice of (1) going to trial, (2)
pleading guilty without a bargain, or (3) negotiating a plea, his upper
limit in dealing with the prosecutor is likely to correspond to the lower of
the two sentences that he perceives as being likely from the first two
alternatives. Likewise, where the prosecutor-seller recognizes that the
defendant has the above three choices, his lower limit in dealing with the
defendant is also likely to correspond to the lower of the two sentences that
he perceives as being likely from those two altematives& available to a
negotiated plea.

III.

EQUILIBRIUM

MODELS APPLIED TO THE DEFENDANT

AND THE PROSECUTOR

A.

Results of Clashes Between Different Bargainers
Since a high percentage of, but not all, negotiations between defendants and prosecutors result in out-of-court settlements, a useful model
should be capable of indicating when a settlement is likely to occur, and
why a settlement occurs in such a high percentage of criminal cases. The
model should also be capable of indicating at what amount settlement is
likely to occur and what other alternatives are likely to be selected if a
settlement does not occur. In showing how the model presented in PartI of
the article is capable of answering these types of questions, Part If will
present the general situation and also other situations involving special
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conditions concerning the defendant's strategies toward the alternatives2 and
both parties' degree of knowledge of the contingent probabilities.
1. General Equilibrium
(a) When convergence is likely to occur
Geometrically speaking, convergence to an equilibrium solution is
likely to occur if in a figure like FIGURE 1 the defendant's limit at his
perceived probability of conviction (PC) is greater than the prosecutor's
1.

FIGURE
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Secuon III-Al, infra, on general equilibrium, is based upon Part I, supra note 1,
Section II-B2(a) (regarding general bargaining limits) and Part I, supra note 1, Section IIB3(a) (regarding general PC calculations). Similarly, Section I1-A2, nfra, on special
equilibrium, is based upon PartI, supra note 1, Section II-B2(b) (regarding special bargaining
limits) and Part I, supra note I, Secuons II-B3(b) thru II-B3(d) (regarding special PC
calculations).
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limit at his perceived PC. Thus, in FIGURE 1, if the defendant's PC is .5, his
maximum limit is 5 years. If the prosecutor's PC is 4, his maximum limit
is 3.2 years. With those facts one can see in FIGURE 1 that the circle
corresponding to the defendant's limit is higher than the circle corresponding to the prosecutor's limit. Convergence is likely to occur in that
situation because the defendant-buyer is willing to accept a greater sentence
than the prosecutor-seller has as his minimum, or the prosecutor-seller is
willing to accept a lesser sentence than the defendant-buyer has as his
maximum. Using a market analogy, convergence is likely to occur in that
situation, because the prosecutor-seller is willing to sell for less than the
price at which the defendant-buyer is willing to buy
On the other hand, if the defendant perceives his PC to be .2, his
maximum limit would be 2 years. A circle corresponding to the defendant's
limit would then be below the prosecutor's limit of 3.2. In that situation,
convergence would be unlikely because the prosecutor would be willing to
accept a solution no lower than 3.2 years, and the defendant would accept
no sentence higher than 2 years. This assumes of course that sentence
maximization and minimization are the goals of the respective parties.
Convergence may not occur not only because the defendant perceives his
conviciton probability as being substantially lower than the prosecutor's
perception of PC but also because the defendant perceives his payoff cells
in TABLE 1 to be substantially less than those payoffs perceived by the
prosecutor. Thus, even if both the defendant and the prosecutor perceive
PC to be .4, there will be no convergence if the defendant perceives that his
maximum sentence on being convicted at trial (cell d) would be 5 years. At
a PC of .4, the defendant perceives that his likely sentence would be only 2
TABLE 1.

THE PAYOFF MATRICES AS PBRCEIVED

BY A DEFENDANT

AND A PROSECUTOR

1A. A DEFENDANT'S PAYOFF MATRIX
Probability of
D Being Convicted (PC)
1.0
0

Alternative
Decisions of D

D Pleads Guilty
before a Judge
without Bargain
(Alt. #2)

ab

D Goes
to Trial
(Alt. #1)

c

4

7

d
0

10

Cells indicate likely sentences (LS) in years as
perceived by a hypothetical defendant (D).

lB.

5
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A

PROSECUTOR'S PAYOFF MATRIX

Probability of
D Being Convicted (PC)
1.0
0

Alternative
Decisions of D

D Pleads Guilty
before a Judge
without Bargain
(Alt. #2)

a

D Goes
to Trial
(Alt. #1)

c

b
3

6
d

0

8

Cells indicate likely sentences (LS) in years as
perceived by a hypothetical prosecutor (P).
years since LS, = 0 + 5(.4) = 2 years.3 Thus, the defendant's 2 year maximum
would be below the prosecutor's 3.2 year minimum.
Plea bargaining is in a sense a non-zero sum game since both parties
are likely to come out ahead of their fall-back limits. In other words, when
a plea bargain is struck, the defendant is getting more satisfaction out of
the waiver which the prosecutor gives him of both trial and unbargamed
judicial pleading than the years he is giving up, since without that waiver
he anticipates he would give up even more years. Similarly, the prosecutor
is getting more satisfaction from the years the defendant gives him than the
waiver or sentence recommendation since he anticipates he would get even
less years if the case were resolved at trial or before a judge by a nonnegotiated plea bargain. Plea bargaining may be less fruitfully viewed as a
zero sum game, in which whatever the defendant gives up the prosecutor
gains. The years paid by the defendant are years received by the prosecutor
in the same way a price is paid and received for merchandise in our buyerseller analogy. Perhaps though plea bargaining should be analyzed as
being neither a non-zero sum game nor a zero sum game, but rather a game
against nature in which both parties are trying to outguess the contingent
probabilities and cell payoffs rather than outguess each other. Nevertheless,
they probably do try to confuse each other by bluffing. From a methodological perspective, one nice thing about the plea bargaining situation is
that it enables one to draw simultaneously upon concepts and methods
from the theory of games, decisions, bargains, static equilibrium, and
4
dynamic equilibrium.
'See
Part 1, supra note 1, Section I-B1.
4

For an example of a model that views plea bargaining in game theory terms see the
forthcoming dissertation of Ivan Orton in the political science department at the University of
Texas [excerpts on file at the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL]. He views the prosecutor as a threat
maker analogous to a blackmailer who can accept the defendant's payment or punish him. He

also views the defendant as the victim of a blackmailer who can either comply with the
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Therefore, if LD5 is greater than LP, 6 a settlement is likely to be
reached, whereas if LD is less than LP, settlement is unlikely to be reached,
unless the adjustments for non-sentence goals cause ALD to be greater than
ALP 7 Similarly, if LD minus LP in a second situation is positive and greater
than LD minus LP in a first example, then the likelihood of a settlement is
greater in the second situation. The model, however, does not provide a
way of assigning probabilities to the likelihood of settlement, because the
degree of probability of a settlement when LD is greater than LP depends
on the bluffing activities of the parties which, unlike LD and LP, are not
predictable from the basic payoff and PC perceptions of the parties. More
will be said about the dynamics of bluffing after further discussing the
likely equilibrium (in general and under special conditions) without
considenng bluffing elements.
(b) Results of convergence and non-convergence
When convergence does occur (meaning LD is likely to be higher than
LP), the settlement point will, generally, be near the midpoint between LD
and LP in the absence of any additional information concerning the
bargaining methods of the parties. In a specific case, one side may have the
ability to bargain or bluff the other side closer to the other side's limit.8 In a
large number of cases, however, with approximately equal bargainers, the
midpoint should be reasonably accurate. Where S* is the likely sentence at
the point of equilibrium, then S* should generally equal .5(LD + LP),
provided that LD is greater than LP 9
What happens, though, if LD is not greater than LP in the solution S *
= .5(LD + LP)? The answer can be best understood by looking at FIGURE 1.
In the example where the defendant had a PC of .2 and thus a 2 year limit,
and the prosecutor had a PC of .4 and thus a 3.2 year limit, the negotiations
would break off unless the parties changed their PC perceptions or their
payoff perceptions. Upon breaking off the negotiations, the defendant
blackmailer's demands or resist them. These dichotomous positions for each side yield a fourcell payoff matrix. Orton also views the defendant as analogous to a blackmailer and the
prosecutor as the victim of a blackmailer, yielding another four-cell payoff matrix. These two
matrices are manipulated to provide some insights into the plea bargaining relations between
prosecutors and defendants, although on a verbal rather than a quantitative level. His basic
idea comes from Ellsberg, The Theory and Practiceof Blackmail (unpublished paper wntten
at Harvard University, 1961).
5
LD is defined to be the bargaining limit of the defendant. See Part I, supra note 1,
Section II-BI.
6
LP is defined to be the bargaining limit of the prosecutor. See Part 1, supra note 1,
Section 7 II-B1.
ALD and ALP are the adjusted bargaining limits of the defendant and prosecutor,
respectively. See Part I, supra note 1, Section II-B4(b).
8At the midpoint between LD and LP, the gain of the defendant under LD is equal to
the gain of the prosecutor over LP In other words, LD minus SO (where SO is the settlement
sentence) equals S minus LP If both parties have equal bluffing power, their gains from SO
should be equal. See A. RAPPAPORT, Two-PERSON GAME THEORY: THE ESSENTIAL IDAS 94-122
(1966) (especially 109 and 120).
9
See note 7, supra.
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would proceed to go to trial since going to trial at his PC of .2 is his best
alternative decision.1 0
If, however, the defendant had a PC of .6, that would mean he would in
effect perceive his likely sentence as being 5.8 years since LS2 = 4 + (7 - 4)
(.6) = 5.8 years." His payoff matrix from TABLE 1, as graphed in FIGURE 1,
indicates that he perceives he could, on average, obtain a sentence of 5.8
years by pleading guilty before a judge in a non-negotiated plea. At a PC of
.6 the defendant would not want to go to trial because trial would produce,
on average, a 6 years sentence (LS, = 0 + 10(.6) = 6 years). 12 In fact, given the
defendant's payoff perceptions, he would prefer to plead guilty before a
judge rather than go to trial whenever his PC is greater than .57 1s Suppose
further that the prosecutor perceives PC to be 1.0, and thus his minimum
limit (LP) would be 6 years, the likely or average sentence he perceives the
defendant would get from a guilty plea before a judge at a PC of 1.0. Thus,
in this hypothetical situation, there would be no convergence because LP is
greater than LD. Unlike the previous hypothetical situation, however, the
defendant would plead guilty before the judge rather than go to trial when
negotiations break off with the prosecutor. This alternative, which presumes that the defendant perceives he can receive a different sentence by
pleading guilty before a judge than by plea bargaining with the prosecutor,
may not be the case in all jurisdictions or in all cases in the same
jurisdiction.
The overall algebraic or symbolic solution to the location of the S*
equilibrium point is thus summarized in the following three convergence
rules:
1. If LD is greater than or equal to LP, then S* = .5(LD + LP).
2. If LD is less than LP (meaning convergence unlikely), and the
defendant's LS1 (likely sentence upon going to trial) is greater than his
LS. (likely sentence from a non-negouated plea), then the defendant will
plead guilty before a judge in a non-negouated plea.
3. If LD is less than LP, and the defendant's LS, is less than his LS2
then the defendant will go to trial.
Note that S* represents the likely sentence or settlement which arises
from plea bargaining when there is a convergence. The likely sentence
from trial or from a guilty plea before a judge is unknown with the given
data.' 4 This is so, because the basic data as given in TABLE 1 merely shows
'oPart I, supra note 1, Seciton II-Al.
is defined to be the likely sentence from pleading guilty before the judge in a noniLS2
negotiated
plea. See Part I, supra note 1, Seciton II-Bl.
2
1 LS 1 is the likely sentence from going to trial. Id.
IsSee Part I, supra note 1, Seciton II-B2(c).
14The true sentence if the defendant goes to trial (known before trial only to an
omniscient being) can be symbolized S' (S primed). If the legal system is a just legal system,
then S' should also bear a close relation to the sentence that would be given by an
omnibenevolent being. The extent to which plea bargaining tends to arrive at such a sentence
is discussed in Section IV-B2, sinra, which deals with the policy implications of the plea
bargaining model.
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what the defendant and the prosecutor perceive the payoffs to be, not what
the payoffs in fact are, as known only to an omniscient being. Even if the
perceived PC's of the parties were averaged in order to derive a better
prediction of the probability of conviction, the true probability of
conviction would still not be known. In other words, this plea bargaining
model is not a judicial decision-making model, although one might try to
16
predict payoff cells1 5 and conviction probabilities.
(c) Why convergence occurs so frequently
How does the model explain why such a high percentage of criminal
cases are settled through plea bargaining? The explanation is probably not
caused by defendants perceiving the payoff cells or conviction probabilities
as being higher than do prosecutors. There are good reasons for thinking
defendants might perceive the situation as being more severe than the
prosecutor does (such as awareness of his own guilt and of aggravating
circumstances). 17 Similarly, the defendant might also perceive the situation
as being less severe (such as wishful thinking based on having more at stake
than the prosecutor does). These reasons tend to neutralize each other.
Indeed, an empirical survey might reveal that the limit lines of defense
counsel and prosecutors as well as their PC's tend to be approximately the
same in a given case or set of hypothetical facts, assuming only sentence
minimization and maximization are involved.
What propels the defendant and the prosecutor toward equilibrium
convergence is the fact that sentence minimization and maximization are
not the only goals present in plea bargaining. The defendant may have
other goals which will tend to raise his unadjusted LD.18 For example, a
defendant will increase his limit for his litigation costs, including (1) the
cost of imprisonment pending trial if the defendant cannot afford bail, (2)
the cost of hiring an attorney if the defendant is not poor enough to receive
a court appointed attorney, but is still unable to easily absorb expensive
attorney fees, and (3) the cost to one's reputation where one is sensitive to
adverse publicity. Likewise, the prosecutor's other goals tend to reduce his
unadjusted LD. His litigation costs include (1) his limited budget, which
prohibits taking all cases to trial, (2) the pressures to reduce court
congestion, and (3) the pressures to build a record with a high percentage
of convictions.
IA other words, the defendant is willing to add a bonus on his LD
maximum limit, and the prosecutor is willing to deduct a discount from his
LP minimum limit. Thus, even if LD equals LP in a given case, those
adjustments are likely to make ALD substantially higher than ALP The
three convergence rules previously given should therefore be adjusted so
15

See
See
17See
IsSee
16

Part I,
Part I,
Part I,
Part I,

supra
supra
supra
supra

note
note
note
note

1,
1,
1,
1,

Section
Section
Section
Section

II-A2.
II-B3.
II-Al.
II-B4.

9
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that ALD (or limit of the defendant adjusted for non-sentence goals) is
substituted for LD. 19 Similarly, wherever those rules say LP, ALP (or limit
of the prosecutor adjusted for non-sentence goals) should be used. Most of
the cases are likely to follow convergence rule 1 rather than nonconvergence rules 2 and 3, since ALD is likely to be greater than ALP a
high percentage of the time. 20 As a result, most criminal cases are settled
through the plea bargaining process.
The exceptional case is the case where the bargaining settlement costs
are greater than the litigation costs. This may be true from the point of
view of the defendant in traffic violations and many minor misdemeanor
cases like city ordinance violations. In those cases, the defendant may
consider it more expensive to plea bargain with a prosecutor than to simply
plead guilty before a judge. The settlement costs may outweigh the
litigation costs from the point of view of the prosecutor at the other end of
the seriousness continuum where, for example, a heinous child murder is
involved. In that kind of a case, the prosecutor may feel he has more to lose
charge or sentence than by expending
politically by settling for a reduced
21
the time and money in trial.
1209See notes 13-14, supra, & text accompanying.
See Part I, supra note 1, Section II-B4.
21
An alternative perspective to FIGURE Ifor analyzing the general equilibrium situation is
the Edgeworth box diagram which is like that shown below:
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Equilibrium Under Special Conditions

In order to further clarify the kind of equilibrium, convergence, or
settlement point, if any, that is likely to be produced by plea bargaining,
the nature of the equilibrium should be discussed, since the parties may
have different strategies toward the alternatives and different degrees of
knowledge of the conviction probabilities.
(a)

The limits matrix

TABLE 2 shows the bargaining limits for various kinds of defendants
and prosecutors, depending on how they are positioned on two dimensions.
The first dimension relates to strategies toward the alternative decisions. It
includes (1) defendants who only see their trial line, possibly because they
are maximax strategists, (2) defendants who only see their plead line,
possibly because they are minimax strategists, and (3) defendants who are
mixed strategists and thus see both lines in their strategies graph and both
22
rows in their payoff matrix.
The continuous lines show that the defendant's bargaining limit is 5 years, and the dashed lines
show that the prosecutor's bargaining limit is 3.2 years. The defendant obtains increased
satisfaction by moving across indifference curves or lines toward the northeast, whereas the
prosecutor obtains increased satisfaction by moving across indifference or equal-satisfacuon
lines toward the southwest. In their bargaining, the defendant moves from near the northeast
corner toward the southwest, and the prosecutor moves from near the southwest comer toward
the northeast. If they both get into the shaded area which is the feasible region, an agreement
will be reached.
This perspective, however, provides less information than FIGURE 1 (see also Part I, supra
note 1, Section II-B) because this perspective only provides one limit point for the defendant and
one for the prosecutor, since FIGURE 1 does not show probabilities of conviction on any axis. It
also provides less information than FIGURE 2 (Section III-B, infra), since it does not show time
stages on any axis. The main value of the Edgeworth box perspective is that it can show degrees
of risk preference or risk avoidance as non-sentence goals by the shape of the indifference curves
which pass through the defendant's payoff points at 0,10 for going to trial and 4, 7 for pleading
before a judge, or which pass through the prosecutor's payoff points at 0,8 for going to trial and
3, 6 for pleading before a judge. If the defendant's trial point is on a higher, lower, or the same
indifference curve as his pleading point, then he is a risk preferrer, risk avoider, or risk neutral
respectively. For further detail on this perspective, see W. BAUMOL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND
OPERATIONS ANALYSIS (1965); J. CRoss, ECONOMICS OF BARGAINING (1969). The Edgeworth box

perspective would be more useful if the two goods being exchanged were both intervally
measured and were shown on each axis. The defendant, however, is paying years in jail to the
prosecutor (which can be intervally measured) in return for a waiver of litigation (which is a
yes-no dichotomy).
22A defendant may also only see his trial line not because he is a maximax strategist but
because it is the only line to see in some places or cases where pleading guilty before the judge
is not a meaningful alternative to going to trial or to plea bargaining with the prosecutor. A
defendant may also only see his plead line not because he is a minimax strategist but because
for reasons of time, money or stigma he just cannot possibly consider going to trial. The first
dimension also includes prosecutors who perceive a given defendant to be a maximax
strategist, a minimax strategist, or a mixed strategist. See Part I, supra note 1, Section II-B2.
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The second dimension relates to conditions of knowledge toward PC. It
includes defendants or prosecutors (1) who are certain of either acquittal or
conviction, (2) who are totally ignorant of what PC might be, and (3) who
think PC is at some fairly precise risk point between PC = 0 and PC = 1.0.
This third category includes those parties who think of PC in terms of a
range but who tend to round off to the lower PC boundary, the midpoint,
or the upper PC boundary, depending on whether they are optimistic,
middling, or pessimistic.
The numbers in the cells of TABLE 2 indicate the upper limit for the
defendant and the lower limit for the prosecutor depending on how each
party is positioned on those two dimensions. For example, in the cell in the
upper lefthand corner, the limit of the defendant who is certain that he will
be acquitted, viewing trial as the only meaningful alternative to plea
bargaining is shown. Such a defendant will not accept an offer from the
prosecutor unless the offer is at or below the defendant's limit of zero years
in jail, assuming he only wants to minimize his sentence. In other words,
the cells do not show what bonus should be added to indicate the nonsentence benefits received by the defendant.
As an example, at the opposite end of TABLE 2, in the cell in the lower
right-hand corner, the limit of the prosecutor who perceives the probability
of conviciton at .4 and who perceives the defendant as working with the
two alternatives to plea bargaining, namely going to trial or pleading
guilty before a judge, is shown. Such a prosecutor will not accept an offer
from the defendant unless the offer is at or above 3.2 years. The 3.2 years is
the expected sentence from a trial at a PC of .4 given the cell payoffs as
perceived by the prosecutor. The prosecutor perceives the defendant as
being more likely to plead guilty before a judge when PC is .4 because
pleading guilty before a judge at a PC of .4 is perceived as producing an
expected sentence of 4.2 years.
At the left side of the graph are shown the LD's and LP's for defendants
and prosecutors certain of acquittal (PC = 0) or conviction (PC = 1.0). In the
middle of the TABLE, the LD's and LP's when the reasonable range of PC is
the total range between 0 and 1.0 are also shown. In the latter situation, the
LD depends on whether the defendant is optimistic (PC = 0), middling (PC
= .5), or pessimistic (PC = 1.0). On the other hand, the LP depends on
whether the prosecutor is optimistic (PC = 1.0), middling (PC = .5), or
pessimistic (PC = 0). On the right side of the TABLE, the LD's of a defendant
who perceives PC at .5 and the LP's of a prosecutor who perceives PC at .4
are shown. A separate LD and LP is shown in all three parts of the TABLE
depending on whether the defendant sees only the trial line, the plead line,
23
or both lines.
2

Sin addition to stating the number of years that corresponds to each type of defendant

and prosecutor, the table also gives the formula that was used to calculate the LD or IP years.
The formulas are stated in terms of the defendant's or the prosecutor's a, b, c, d perceived cell
payoffs. All the formulas in the first and second thirds of the table on the left side are
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In TABLE 2, there are many types of defendants and many types of
prosecutors. There are in fact three types of defendants who operate under a
condition of risk, namely a maximax risk defendant, a minimax risk
defendant, and a mixed strategy risk defendant. In addition, there are nine
types of defendants who operate under conditions of ignorance since there
are three strategies corresponding to each of the three optimism-pessimism
points. Moreover, there are six types of defendants operating under
conditions of certainty since there are two conditions of certainty and three
strategies toward the alternatives.
Even though there are eighteen possible types of defendants and
prosecutors shown in TABLE 2, this does not necessarily mean that all types
correspond to defendants and prosecutors who frequently exist, and
especially not in equal numbers. For example, there are at least two
defendant types that probably represent null classes. One is the defendant
who sees only the plead line even though he is certain of acquittal. Any
defendant who is certain of acquittal is unlikely to consider pleading
guilty, unless a minor traffic or parking violation is involved. This
"unless" limitation is not true for the hypothetical felony for which the
defendant could conceivably receive at least ten years maximum penalty.
The other null class is the defendant who sees only the trial line even
though he is certain of conviction. Any defendant who is certain of
conviction is unlikely to go to trial where his sentence is likely to be higher
than pleading guilty before a judge. 24 The most common situations in
TABLE 2 are probably conditions of risk (i.e. the right side) with defendants
pursuing a mixed strategy that involves considering both the trial line and
the plead line (i.e. the bottom row possibilities).
(b) The results matrix
TABLE 3 shows the results of clashes between certain types of defendants
and prosecutors. If each of the eighteen types of defendants were pitted
against the eighteen types of prosecutors shown in TABLE 2, 324 scenarios
would be generated which is a rather large number of clashes to show in
one results table. To make the TABLE more manageable, TABLE 3 just deals
with eight types of defendants and eight types of prosecutors (and thus 64
scenarios) by dealing only with the middling optimism-pessimism type of
party under conditions of ignorance, and only with the mixed strategist
type of party under conditions of certainty. The reader can stage any of the
remaining scenarios if he wishes to do so.
simplified versions of the formulas in the last third of the table on the right side. For example,
the optimistic prosecutor who lacks any knowledge of PC and who operates in a jurisdiction
where going to trial is the only alternative to plea bargaining has an LP of 8 years based on
cell d. That 8 could also be calculated from the formula LS, = 0 + (8-0) (1.0), or from the
formula LS, = (1-1.0)0 + (1.0)8, both of which are given in the last third of the table. To review
what is involved in calculating an LD or an LP, the reader can check the calculations for any
or all of the cells in TABLE 2 using the raw data from TABLE I and the graphical approach of
FIGURE24 1.
The defendant will not plead guilty if he knows the judge will give him a more severe
sentence than will the jury in those unusual places where juries can determine sentence. See
Part I, supra note 1, Seciton 1I-Al.
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Conditions of convergence:
1. Convergence if LD>LP
2. Non convergence if LD<LP
Results of Convergence: S* = .5 (LD + LP)
Results of Non-Convergence:
1. T = Sentence determined by D going to trial. LD<5.71.
2. J = Sentence determined by D going to judge and pleading guilty. LD>5.71.
3. F = Coin flip or related random method will determine whether D goes to trial or pleads
before judge. LD = 5.71.
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To read TABLE 3, find the cell corresponding to any particular clash
between a hypothetical defendant and prosecutor. Take for instance the cell
in the lower right-hand corner where each party is operating under
conditions of risk and each one is considering both the trial alternative and
the plead alternative. In that scenario, the hypothetical defendant has an
upper limit (LD) of 5 years, and our hypothetical prosecutor has a lower
limit (LP) of 3.2 years. Since the defendant's upper limit is greater than the
prosecutor's lower limit, there is likely to be convergence, and the likely
convergence point (S*) should be near the midpoint between LD and LP
(i.e. 4.1).
Some of the scenarios, on the other hand, involve an LD that is lower
than the LP for that scenario. For example, if the defendant, given his
perceived cell payoffs and his perceived PC of .5, considers both the trial
and plead lines or alternatives, then he will have an LD of 5. If, however,
the prosecutor is certain the defendant will be convicted and the prosecutor
also considers both lines, then the prosecutor will have an LP of 6 as
shown in column two of the bottom row. Therefore, convergence will not
occur, and the defendant will resort to either trial or pleading guilty before
a judge. Which alternative he chooses will depend on whether LD is greater
or less than LS*, which is the likely sentence at the point where LS, equals
LS2 . In this specific hypothetical situation, since LD is 5 and LS* is 5.71,
the defendant will go to trial as his alternative to a settlement through plea
bargaining.
There are no cells in our TABLE 3 where non-convergence was resolved
by the defendant electing to plead guilty before a judge. A hypothetical
situation could be created, though, where such a resolution would have
occurred in our results matrix. A defendant with the same payoffs as TABLE
1 but who perceives his probability of conviction as being greater than .57
rather than just .5 would elect to plead guilty before a judge. In that
situation, if LD is less than LP, the hypothetical defendant will elect a
guilty plea in order to minimize his sentence. 25 To the extent that
25
We could have also had some J's in TABLE 3 by changing the defendant's payoff cells
so that with a PC of .5 or even lower, his LD would be greater than his LS*. Doing so would
involve decreasing cells a and b and/or increasing cells c and d. TABLE 3 would also have some
J's in it if we had included the pessimistic defendant operating under conditions of ignorance
rather than just the middle defendant, since the pessimistic defendant perceives PC to be 1.0.
There seems to be no empirical data available indicating what percentage of the time
the defendant turns to the judge with a non-bargained guilty plea rather than go to trial when
plea bargaining negotiations break down. Donald Newman's data indicates that in the
Wisconsin county he studied, six percent of all the felony cases went to trial, 56 percent were
settled by plea bargaining (i.e. .60 times .94), and 38 percent were settled by non-bargained
guilty pleas (i.e. .40 times .94). See Part I, supra note I, Section I. However, the data does not
indicate (1) what proportion of the 38 percent involving guilty pleas never involved plea
bargaining, (2) what proportion did involve plea bargaining that broke down, (3) what
proportion of the 6 percent that went to trial never involved plea bargaining, and (4) what
proportion did involve plea bargaining that broke down. To determine the most common
alternative occurrence when plea bargaining breaks down, one must compare proportions (2'
times .38 and (4) times .06. Writers on plea bargaining often assume that if plea bargaininc
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defendants tend to think their conviction probabilities are low partly
explains why defendants may be more likely to resort to trial as an
alternative to plea bargaining. Part of the explanation may also relate to
the fact that in many jurisdictions judges ask for the prosecutor's
sentencing recommendation if the defendant pleads guilty, and thus the
judge may not serve as a sufficiently independent alternative to the
26
prosecutor.
Both the defendant and the prosecutor would like to know what the
other side's payoff cells, PC perceptions, and thus bargaining limits are so
that each side could strike a bargain that will maximize his side's gain and
minimize the other side's gain, but still obtain convergence. They both,
however, try to make their own payoff and PC perceptions, and thus their
limits, reflect reality as accurately as possible rather than reflect the other
side's possible misperceptions, especially where they have encouraged
pessimistic misperceptions by the other side. That kind of bluffing
encouragement comes out more clearly in discussing the dynamic equilibrium model.
B.

The Dynamics of Converging Toward Equilibrium

1. The Time Path Graph
TABLE-s 2 and 3 involved the calculation of equilibrium points which
are likely to be determined by different types of defendants with different
payoff and PC perceptions. 27 The discussion highlighted the given data
and the results. However, the process whereby one moves from the givens to
the results was not discussed. Thus, the equilibrium discussion has so far
were made more difficult, the quantity of trials would increase greatly causing the criminal
justice system to collapse. Such writers tend to think that the only alternative to plea
bargaining is to go to trial rather than to plead guilty before a judge who is likely to give a
lower sentence after a guilty plea than after a trial conviction. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 10

(1967); Hoffman, Plea Bargainingand the Role of the Judge, 53 F.R.D. 499 (1971); Landes, An
Economic Approach of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971). Pleading guilty before a
judge without plea bargaining consumes some judicial resources, but not nearly so much as a
trial. 26
1n order to simplify the arithmetic in the example by using a defendant with a PC of
.5, some repetition was introduced in TABLE 3 and TABLE 2. If the defendant was ignorant of
PC and middling on the optimism-pessimism scale he had the same limit as if he was
knowledgeable that PC equals .5 in his case. It is not artificial repetition, however, that on any
given row in TABLE 3 the LD of the defendant remains the same. That is so because neither the
payoff cells nor the LD of the defendant is changed by the type of prosecutor with which he is
dealing, except in the sense that the more competent the prosecutor, the higher the defendant
should perceive PC to be, and the more severe and influential the prosecutor, the higher the
defendant should perceive the payoffs to be. Similarly, on any given column the LP of the
prosecutor remains the same beca4se the LP is not changed by the type of defendant or defense
counsel with which he is dealing, except in the sense that the more sympathy-arousing or
competent the other side, the lower the prosecutor should perceive PC and the payoff cells to
be.
27
See Section III-A, supra.
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been a static rather than a dynamic or process equilibrium. More
specifically, it has been a comparative static equilibrium because the
equilibrium points produced by different types of situations have been
compared. It now seems appropriate to seek to extend the model to explain
in simple arithmetic terms the process of moving from the givens to the
results.
FIGURE 2 introduces a time dimension on the horizontal axis as
contrasted to the probability dimension on the horizontal axis of FIGURE 1.
The vertical axes on both figures represent sentence severity or charge
severity where there is bargaining over the charge instead of, or in addition
to, bargaining over the sentence. In FIGURE 1, however, the vertical axis
represents years likely to be received at different conviction probabilities,
whereas in FIGURE 2 the vertical axis represents years offered by the
defendant or the prosecutor at different stages in the negotiation process.
FIGURE 2 is referred to as a time path graph because it shows how
converging or diverging variables change over time. The variables in this
situation are the defendant's offers and the prosecutor's offers.
Most of the data used in FIGURE 2 comes from the payoff matrices of
TABLE 1, the bargaining limits of FIGURE 1 and TABLE 2, and from the
previous discussion of the defendant's bonus factor and the prosecutor's
28
discount factor.
The only change from the previous examples which we used is to set the
prosecutor's perceived probability of conviction at .7 rather than .4. This
has the effect of making the prosecutor and the defendant initially further
apart, so that the convergence process will occur more slowly for
observation. As indicated at the bottom of FIGURE 2, the defendant's upper
limit is 5 years when only considering sentence minimization and 5!l years
when adjusted by a ten percent bonus to consider other goals. Similarly, the
prosecutor's lower limit is 5.1 years when only considering sentence
maximization and 4.34 years when adjusted by a fifteen percent discount to
consider other goals. Over the time points in the dynamic bargaining
process, either ALD or ALP can change as a result of new information or
new values. For the sake of simplicity, however, FIGURE 2 shows ALD and
ALP as being constant across the graph.
2.

Initial Offers and Bluffing
In order to understand FIGURE 2 better, it is necessary to introduce two
new concepts which intervene between the givens of TABLE 2 and the
results of TABLE 3. The concepts are initial offer and counter offer. These
concepts are easier to understand if we recall the analogy of the defendant
(or prosecutor) to a buyer (or seller) who is seeking as low (or high) a price
as possible in a bargaining bazaar without fixed prices. Under those
circumstances, the initial offer of the defendant would logically be lower
2

8See Part , supra note I, Section II-B4(b).
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Givens:
a = 4, b = 7, c = 0, d = 10, PC =.5,
%XD = .10, EF = .5, RD = .3
Calculations:
PC* = (a-c)/(a-b-c+d) = (4-0)/(4-7-0+
10) = .57
LD = LS, since PC < PC*
LD = LS, = c + (d-c)PC = 0 + (10-0).5
=5
ALD = LD + (%XD LD) = 5 +
(.10.5) = 5.5
Oo = EF ° ALD = .5(5.5) = 2.75
0, = Oo + RD(ALD - O,o)
= 2.75 + .3(5.5 - 2.75) = 3.58

Givens:
a = 3, b = 6, c = 0, d = 8, PC = .7,
%XP = .15, EF = 2, RP = .5
Calculations:
PC* = (a-c)/(a-b-c+d) = (3-0)/(3-6-0+
8) = .60
LP = LS 2 since PC > PC*
LP = LS2 = a + (b-c)PC = 3 + (6-3).7 =
5.1
ALP = LP - (%XP • LP) = 5.1 (.15 • 5.1) = 4.34
0,= EF ° ALP = 2(4.34) = 8.68
0,= O - RP(Oo - ALP)
= 8.68 - .5(8.68 - 4.34) = 6.51
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than the limit he is finally willing to accept. Similarly, the initial offer of
the prosecutor would logically be higher than the limit he is willing to
accept. A better understanding of the nature of initial offers in plea
bargaining is quite helpful in understanding the dynamics of going from
the inputs to the outputs of the bargaining process, especially with regard
to bluffing or exaggerating one's statements about outer limits, the likely
sentence, or the probability of conviction.
(a) Calculating initial offers
The defendant's initial offer should be calculated by multiplying his
limit by some fraction less than one. That decimal can be called the
defendant's exaggeration factor, since it represents a coefficient of the
degree to which he exaggerates the lowness of the limit. Multiplication of
the defendant's limit by such a decimal in effect reduces the defendant's
upper limit to indicate his low initial position. For the want of better
information, 29 assume the hypothetical defendant has an exaggeration
factor of .5, meaning his initial offer is one-half of his bargaining limit.
The size of the defendant's exaggeration factor (EF) depends partly on
the psychology of his bluffing strategy. If the defendant sets his exaggeration factor at .1 or an extremely low point, he may cause the prosecutor to
consider him unreasonable. The prosecutor may then break off negotiations even though the defendant may really have been willing to settle at a
mutually good bargain. On the other hand, if the defendant sets his
exaggeration factor at .9 or an extremely high point, he may yield too
much just to obtain an agreement. Where within this range the defendant
sets his exaggeration factor depends partly on what he perceives ihe
prosecutor's likely reaction to be, although the defendant may have an
opportunity to remedy an unduly high or unduly low exaggeration factor
by compensating on his first counter-offer. The defendant's credibility,
however, will be disrupted if his first counter offer is a lot higher than his
initial offer in order to compensate for an unduly low initial offer.
Similarly, the defendant's reasonableness or good faith will be put in doubt
if his first counter offer involves a backward move or trivial difference
upward from his initial offer in order to compensate for an unduly high
initial offer. The credibility of an offer refers to telling the truth when
stating one's limits. The reasonableness or good faith of an offer refers to
30
being willing to make concessions.
The point at which the defendant sets his exaggeration factor, and thus
his initial offer, also depends on his willingness to go to trial.3' The more
29Perhaps a questionnaire survey aimed at defense counsel would reveal more precisely
how much less the average defendant or defense counsel tends to offer in stating his initial
bargaining position than he is actually willing to accept.
"For further discussion of the psychology of bluffing and other negotiation techniques,
see J. ILICH, THE ART AND SKILL OF SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION (1973); C. KARRASS, THE
NEGOTIATING GAME (1970); R. WALTON & R. McKEESIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR
NEGOTIATION (1965).
"1His willingness to go to trial is governed by his position on the maximax-minimax
dimension regarding his perception of the trial-pleading alternatives, the optimism-pessimism
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willing he is to go to trial, the more he will exaggerate the lowness of his
bargaining limit, since he is not so concerned with making an offer the
prosecutor will eventually accept. In these cases, the defendant is more
likely to have an exaggeration factor of .1 rather than .9. Thus, if the
adjusted limit is 5 years, the defendant who is more willing to go to trial is
more likely to have an initial offer of 6 months rather than 4 years.
To calculate the prosecutor's initial offer, multiply his limit by some
integer or fraction greater than 1. Multiplying the prosecutor's limit by
such a number increases the prosecutor's lower limit to indicate his high
initial position. For the want of better information,12 the hypothetical
prosecutor may be assumed to have an exaggeration factor of two, meaning
he tends to double his initial offer. Like the defendant, the exact position of
the prosecutor's exaggeration factor depends partly on the psychology of
his bluffing strategy in dealing with the defendant and on the prosecutor's
willingness to go to trial. 3
The higher the defendant's limit, the higher is his initial offer if his
exaggeration is held constant since his initial offer is the product of his
exaggeration factor times his limit. The same is true of the prosecutor. If
the defendant's limit is high, however, the defendant is also likely to
exaggerate more how low his limit is by using a smaller decimal for an
exaggeration factor. This may be true because defendants may be more
willing to go to trial, particularly to benefit from the safeguards for the
innocent, when (1) the crime is more severe, (2) the likely sentence is
therefore greater, and (3) the defendant-buyer's bargaining limit or maximum price is thus higher. As previously mentioned, the more willing the
defendant is to go to trial, the more he may exaggerate in a downward
direction his bargaining limit by setting a low initial offer because he cares
less about the negotiations breaking down. If the exaggeration factor is
partly determined by ALD or the defendant's limit, then the exaggeration
factor is at least partly an endogenous variable, i.e. determined by one of
the variables which can be calculated, rather than a given or exogenous
variable. Nevertheless, for both the defendant and the prosecutor, the
exaggeration factor is probably mainly determined by the psychology of
34
bluffing strategies.
dimension regarding his narrowing of the PC or cell payoff ranges, and the risk preferrer-risk
avoidance dimension regarding his attitude toward risk as a non-sentence goal. His
willingness to go to trial also varies with the severity of the crime in the sense that the more
severe the crime, the less likely the defendant will plead guilty. Similarly, the defendant is more
willing to go to trial if his litigation costs are lowered and his settlement costs are raised.
"5See note 29, supra.
33In our hypothetical example, the defendant's exaggeration factor is the reciprocal of
the prosecutor's exaggeration factor and vice versa. This is coincidental since they are
determined separately although a prosecutor may tend to exaggerate his lower limit more if he
perceives
that the defendant is highly exaggerating his upper limit and vice versa.
34The splitting rate discussed in Section III-B3, infra, is also a function of bluffing
psychology. On the mathematics of bluffing, see J. CROSS, ECONOMICS OF BARGAINING, 166-80
(1969). As Cross emphasizes and as both our static and dynamic models tend to show, where
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Bluffing involves communicating information that the communicator
thinks is false to the other party with regard to the communicator's limits
or with regard to facts relevant to the sentence payoffs or the conviction
probability. Bluffing is not likely to have any effect on whether there will
be convergence if bluffing merely understates the defendant's ALD or
overstates the prosecutor's ALP at the initial offer stage or a counter offer
stage. Whether or not convergence will occur is mainly dependent on
whether ALD is greater than ALP. The exception to this rule is where the
bluffing is strong enough and persisted in long enough to cause the other
side to break off negotiations prematurely. Bluffing as to ALD and ALP,
however, can influence the point of convergence, since convergence tends
to be at the midpoint between the bluffed or claimed ALD and the bluffed
or claimed ALP. Bluffing can especially affect the convergence point if the
bluffing causes the defendant to think the payoff sentences and conviction
probability are higher than they really are, or if the bluffing causes the
prosecutor to think the payoffs and PC are lower than they really are.
If both sides would refrain from engaging in any bluffing or exaggeration, but instead would immediately inform the other side what their
respective limits are, then approximately the same agreement or nonagreement could be reached much more quickly, assuming the bluffing on
both sides is evenly balanced in degree of exaggeration and credibility. It is,
however, unrealistic to expect competitive sides with valuable stakes to be
that cooperative and trusting. Likewise, agreement could be reached more
quickly (and with results that come closer to the true sentence which would
be arrived at through a trial) if the parties would share information with
each other concerning the probability of conviction and the sentence
payoffs, rather than try to bluff each other into thinking PC and the payoff
cells are lower or higher than they really are. Discovery can force a more
35
honest sharing of information.
Applying the defendant's exaggeration factor of .5 to his adjusted limit
of 5! years, his initial offer should be 2.75 years. That initial offer is
symbolized DO,0 for defendant's offer at time zero. Applying the prosecutor's exaggeration factor of two to his adjusted limit of 4.34 years, his
initial offer (PO,0) is 8.68 years. One might ask how a prosecutor with any
credibility or ethical reasonableness could ask for 8.68 years initially when
the defendant "knows," according to FIGURE 2, that the worst that is likely
to happen to him in our hypothetical case is that he will get 5 years by
going to trial or 5.5 years by pleading guilty before a judge. The answer is
the parties start in their bargaining generally has little effect on the point of agreement (S*)
which is largely determined by the defendant's limit (ALD) and the prosecutor's limit (ALP).
In the model, as is clarified in Section III-B2(c), infra, the initial offers have no bearing on
whether convergence will be reached since that is determined by whether ALD is greater than
ALP. The initial offers along with the splitting rates, however, do determine the last counter
offers before the parties cross over, and the midpoint between those last counter offers is the

likely settlement point. See Section III-B4, infra.
35See Section IV-Bl, infra.
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that the defendant really is not absolutely certain that his estimate is
correct, since he may be too low in his perception that .5 is his conviction
probability, and he may be too low in his perception of the cell payoffs for
trial and pleading. Indeed, the prosecutor will try to convince the defendant
that his perceptions are too low. 36 Similarly, the defendant will try to
convince the prosecutor that his perceptions are too high, giving the
defendant's initial offer more credibility and reasonableness.
(b) Ordering initial offers
Once the considerations involved in calculating the initial offers have
been determined, the next question is who shall make the first initial offer.
Who makes the first offer is irrelevant to whether and at what point an
equilibrium will be attained, but it is relevant to describing the dynamics
of plea bargaining negotiation. Like the exaggeration factor, the order of
the initial offers is largely determined by the psychology and personalities
of the bargainers 37 rather than through the deductive axiomatic reasoning
used to arrive at the defendant's limit, the prosecutor's limit, and their
equilibrium point.
Nevertheless, perhaps one can say ihat if the prosecutor perceives PC as
being low, he is more likely to make an initial offer to avoid trial than if he
perceives PC as being high. Similarly, if the defendant perceives PC as
being high he is more likely to make an initial offer to avoid trial than if he
perceives PC as being low. A high PC in this context can be defined as one
above PC*,3S and a low PC as one below PC*. Normally, both the
prosecutor and the defendant would perceive PC as being about equally
high or equally low. If, however, the prosecutor perceives PC as being low
and the defendant perceives PC as being high, both will want to avoid trial.
In that case, the initial offer would probably be made by the side whose
perceived PC is closest to his maximum pessimistic position. In other
words, if the PC of the prosecutor minus 0.0 is smaller than 1.0 minus the
PC of the defendant, then the prosecutor will tend to make the initial offer.
Otherwise, the defendant will. More empirically valid procedures could be
established for determining which party should make the first offer,3 9 but
for the purposes of this model, this formula should be satisfactory.
Applying the above analysis to the data shown at the bottom of FIGURE
2, the defendant perceives PC as being low, since his perceived PC of .5 is
S6The prosecutor's initial offer can still be meaningful even if it is greater than either the
defendant's or the prosecutor's perception of cell d which shows the likely sentence if the
defendant is convicted after a trial. The prosecutor's initial offer cannot be meaningful or
ethical, though, if it is greater than the statutory maximum allowed for the crime involved.
3
1See notes 29-36, supra, & text accompanying.
38
See Part I, supra note 1, Section I-B2(c).
"This 'matter of who initiates plea bargaining may, however, be more determined by
institutionalized procedures for different crime categories than by the evidence in specific
cases. We thus have in the ordering of initial offers another side aspect of our model which
can be empirically tested through a questionnaire and interviewing survey.
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below his PC* of .57. Therefore, the defendant has a preference for trial as
compared to pleading guilty before a judge without a bargain. In addition,
the prosecutor perceives PC as being high, since his perceived PC of .7 is
above his PC* of .60. The prosecutor is also not so anxious to avoid trial
since he perceives trial as likely to produce a longer sentence than that
produced by pleading guilty before a judge. The defendant, however, is
likely to be less enthusiastic about going to trial than the prosecutor is
since .5 is only .07 less than .57, whereas .7 is .10 more than .60. Thus, the
defendant is more likely to make the initial offer. The same conclusion'
could be reached by observing that the distance between .5 and 1.0, the
worst PC the defendant could have, is less than the distance between .7 and
0.0, the worst PC the prosecutor could have. In other words, since the
defendant perceives his trial alternative as less attractive than the prosecutor
views his own trial alternative, the defendant is more likely to make the
first move toward settlement.
(c) Relation to convergence
It should be noted that one cannot tell whether there will be
convergence by simply observing the relative rank or closeness of the initial
offers. Convergence occurs if the adjusted limit of the defendant is greater
than or equal to the adjusted limit of the prosecutor. Convergence fails
and negotiations break down if the adjusted limit of the defendant is less
than the adjusted limit of the prosecutor. In either of these situations,
however, the initial offer of the prosecutor will be greater than the initial
offer of the defendant. Likewise, even though the initial offers of the
prosecutor and the defendant may be very far apart, they will still reach
convergence if ALD is greater than ALP. The corollary of this is that if the
initial offers of the prosecutor and the defendant are very close together,
they may still not reach convergence if ALD is smaller than ALP.
The reason the initial offer of the prosecutor is almost always likely to
be greater than the initial offer of the defendant is because neither the
prosecutor nor the defendant is ever likely to cross over the other in making
either their initial offers or their counter offers. In other words, if the
prosecutor initially offers seven years, the defendant's first offer is not going
to be greater than seven years if he is seeking to minimize his sentence.
Likewise, if the defendant's initial offer is three years, the prosecutor's first
offer is not going to be less than three years if he is seeking to maximize the
sentence. This is true at any stage in the negotiations process.
As a result, given the data in FIGURE 2, the defendant is likely to make
the first offer, which should be 2 3/4 years. The prosecutor is then likely to
initially offer about 8 2/3 years. In a dynamic scenario the defendant is
now ready to make his first counter offer.
3. Calculating Counter Offers
A counter offer is any offer made by a party after his initial offer. It
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seems reasonable to expect each counter offer of the defendant to be higher
than his low initial offer. In other words, the defendant's offer should
reasonably be expected to ascend in staircase fashion, although not
necessarily in equal jumps, from his initial offer toward his bargaining
limit. Likewise, it seems reasonable to expect the prosecutor's offers to
descend in staircase fashion from his high initial offer toward his
bargaining limit. In bargaining, one normally makes bigger concessions or
bigger jumps in the beginning and then smaller concessions as one gets
closer toward one's limit or a settlement point. There may be some
situations, of course, where either the prosecutor or the defendant backtracks because he feels he has gone too far in light of his new perceptions of
PC or the payoffs, or because the other side seems especially willing to
concede. Nevertheless, the general trend of the defendant's counter offers is
upward, and the prosecutor's counter offers is downward, as shown in the
time-path graph of FIGURE 2.
(a) First counter offer
In light of the above, the first counter offer of the defendant equals his
initial offer plus an increment. Likewise, the first counter offer of the
prosecutor equals his initial offer minus a decrement. The increment for
the defendant equals a portion of the distance between his last offer and his
bargaining limit. The decrement for the prosecutor equals a portion of the
distance between his last offer and his bargaining limit.4 0 The portion of
that distance for either the defendant or the prosecutor is a decimal less
than one assuming the defendant or the prosecutor do not jump to their
bargaining limit. That decimal or "splitting rate" can be symbolized RD
41
for the defendant and RP for the prosecutor.
The splitting rates for the defendant and the prosecutor are determined
by the same kind of considerations with regard to the psychology of
bluffing strategy and one's willingness to go to trial that determined the
exaggeration factors. 42 For lack of any better information, assume the
defendant has a splitting rate of .3 and the prosecutor has a splitting rate of
40

The increment for the defendant would never be so great as to make the defendant's
next offer equal a sentence greater than the prosecutor's last offer. Likewise, the decrement for
the prosecutor would never be so great as to make the proseucotr's next offer equal a sentence
less than the defendant's last offer. This is true at any stage in the negotiation process, see
Section
III-B2(c) and Section III-B4, infra.
41
By changing the first sign and reversing the order of the limit and the initial offer, an
alternative way to write the prosecutor's first counter offer would be Ol, O=0 + RP(ALP -Oro),
which would achieve the same effect although in a less obvious manner. The defendant's first
counter offer could be similarly rewritten.
Thus, the first counter offer for the defendant can be defined as DOt, = O0+ RD(ALD
- O0), and the first counter offer for the prosecutor as P0, 1 = Oto - RP(O, 0 - ALP). The product
of the splitting rate and the distance to be covered is preceded by a plus sign for the defendant
since it is a positive increment. A minus sign is used for the prosecutor, because his is a
negative decrement. DOt0 is subtracted from ALD in determining the distance left to be
covered by the defendant, because ALD is always larger than DO, but ALP is subtracted from
PO0, in determining the distance to be covered by the prosecutor, because PO0 is always larger
than ALP.
42See notes 29-37, supra, & text accompanying.
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.5. Perhaps they should have had closer splitting rates since their
exaggeration factors are the reciprocals of each other. However, since the
hypothetical defendant is more anxious to avoid trial, perhaps he should
have a higher splitting rate than the prosecutor. On the other hand, given
the greater financial pressures on the prosecutor, perhaps he should have a
higher splitting rate, since empirical reality may indicate that prosecutors
are generally more willing to settle out of court than are defendants. Since
good arguments can thus be made for different relative rankings of the RD
and RP splitting rates, the RD of .3 and the RP of .5 will be assumed to be
reasonable. Over the time points in the dynamic bargaining process, either
RD or RP can vary as a result of changes in one's willingness to go to trial
or one's bluffing psychology or the reactions of the opponent. For the sake
of simplicity, however, FIGURE 2 shows RD and RP as being constant
across the graph.
Applying the formulas for calculating the first counter offers of the
defendant and the prosecutor to the data provided in FIGURE 2, the
defendant's first counter offer is predicted to be 3.58 years or about 3Y years.
Likewise, the prosecutor's first counter offer is determined to be 6.51 years
or about 6!4 years. The calculations are shown at the bottom of FIGURE 2.
Thus, at the first stage, the bargainers have not yet converged on a common
settlement sentence. In fact, neither side has yet crossed the limit of the
other side. Before proceeding to the next stage, it seems appropriate to
briefly develop some formulas that have greater generality and insight
value in calculating counter offers.
(b) Incremental counter offer
From the above definitional equations of the first counter offers, a
general incremental equation determining the counter offer at any stage
can be derived. That general equation is O = Ot., + R(L - Oj-i). In this
equation, O, is the counter offer at time i; Oj. is the counter offer of the
previous stage or time i minus one time unit; R is the splitting rate for
either the defendant or the prosecutor; and L is the bargaining limit for
either party. Since L for the defendant is greater than any of his counter
offers, then L - Oj.j will be positive, and R times that distance will be a
positive increment for the defendant. Since L for the prosecutor is less than
any of his counter offers, than L - Oj., will be negative, and R times that
distance will be a negative decrement for the prosecutor.
With the general counter offer equation we can derive a number of
other useful definitions and equations. The absolute difference between L O,j.j is the distance left to be covered-after stage O,j.j . The product R(L Oa.j ) is the postive or negative increment to be added to Oj.j to get O. The
sum of all the increments from the initial offer to O,i can be added to O, 0 to
get Oj. If Oj is the infinite stage, then the sum of all the increments added
to Ot0 will equal the bargaining limit toward which the offers are moving.
Since each increment represents only a portion of the remaining distance,
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there is never an increment that completes the remaining distance to the
bargaining limit unless the bargainer changes his splitting rate or his
increment. At any point in the process, a bargainer can change his splitting
rate or his bargaining limit if he acquires new perceptions of PC, the
payoff cells, or new perceptions of how far he can push the other side.
Applying this general formula for determining counter offers, we find
that the second counter offer for the defendant equals 0,2., = RD(ALD - 02.1),
or 4.16, i.e. 3.58 + .3(5.5 - 3.58). Similarly, the second counter offer for
the prosecutor equals 02. + RP(ALP - 02.0, or 5.43, i.e. 6.51 - .5(6.51 4.34). The defendant's second counter offer ot 4.16 years still has not crossed
above the prosecutor's lower limit of 4.34 years, even though the prosecutor's second counter offer of 5.43 years has crossed under the defendant's
upper limit of 5.50 years. This means the prosecutor may be getting a little
frustrated, not because he has crossed the defendant's upper limit, which he
is not likely to know, but rather because the defendant has still not crossed
the prosecutor's lower limit. The defendant, on the other hand, may be
gloating because he is succeeding in getting a good bargain, but like a good
poker player he will push for an even bigger pot if he can get it.
(c) General solution counter offer
One problem with the general equation for determining the counter
offer at any given stage is that it requires knowing the counter offer at the
previous stage, which requires knowing the counter offer at the stage before
that, and back to the initial offer. That was no problem when the first
counter offer was calculated. At later counter offers, though, a more useful
equation should state the value of 0, (or the counter offer at any stage or
time i) in terms of the initial offer, the limit, and the splitting rate without
requiring knowledge of the previous counter offers. This involves solving
for Oi in terms of O, L, and R with no 0,, on the right side of the
equation. Applying a more complex mathematical technique, the general
43
solution is O,i = L + (1 - R)Y (0,, - L).
Applying the new solution equation to the third stage, the third
counter offer of the defendant equals ALD + (I- RD)i (O,0 - ALD), or 4.56,
i.e. 5.50 + (1 - .3)1 (2.75 - 5.50). That is exactly the same -esult determined
by the definitional equation, calculating each successive counter offer until
the counter offer for the third stage is found. Similarly, the third counter
offer for the prosecutor equals ALP + (1-RP) _(O,0 - ALP), or 4.88, i.e. 4.34
+ (1 - .5)3 (8.68 - 4.34). Note that the solution equation not only saves times,
4
1The general definitional or incremental equation cannot be solved for Oi by simple
high school algebra. Instead, the methods developed in slightly more advanced algebra for
solving difference equations must be used. A difference equation is an equation that involves
an expression (likeO,,) which is a function of itself at an earlier or later integer point in time
(like Oti.l) plus or minus an increment, as in the equation Oti = Oti. + R(L - Otjq). The

solution of this equation involves using a combination of the rules of difference equations,
high school algebra, and geometric progressions, and is Oi = L + (I - R)i(Ot 0 - L).
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but also avoids clerical and rounding errors which can occur from
successive calculations with the incremental or definitional equation. 44
4.

Convergence: Its Occurrence, Meaning, and Likelihood

At the third stage, the prosecutor and the defendant are within each
other's bargaining limits. This means there will be convergence. The
parties would be likely to converge from the very beginning, since the
defendant's limit is higher than the prosecutor's limit; but coming within
each other's bargaining limits makes convergence more nearly certain.
However, just -because both parties are within each other's bargaining
limits does not mean the counter offers are completed. If counter offers at
the next stage do not cross over each other, then another set of counter
offers will be made. In FIGURE 2, however, at the fourth stage the
defendant's counter offer would be 4.84 or about 5 years, and the
The solution is as follows:
EQUATION
1. Od = Od.l + R(L - Odi1)
2. Ot+l = O, + R(L - Oi)

SOURCE
(Our basic definitional equation)
(Eq. 1 applied to stage ti+l)

Od+1 = O d + RL - ROd

(Multiplying by R to remove the parentheses)

5.
6.

01= Ot0(l - R) + RL
Ot = [Oto(l - R) + RL] (I - R) + RL

7.

Oti = Oto(l - R)di + RL(I - R)ti-I

(Factoring out the Oti so it appears only once
on the right side)
(Eq. 4 applied to stage tl)
(A combination of Eq. 4 and Eq. 5 applied to
stage t2)
(Simplifying and removing brackets from

8.

+ . . . + RL(I - R) ti-ti
Oti = Oto(l - R)ti + L - L(I - R)ti

Eq. 6)
(Inserting and simplifying the sum of a

3.

4.

Oti+1 = Od(l - R) + RL

geometric progression for the +... + expression in Eq. 7)
9.

Od = L + (1 - R)u(Oto - L)

(Simplifying Eq. 8)

Note the sum of the geometric progression (e.g., .2 + .4 + .8 + .16 + .32, etc.) in Eq. 7 is [RL ]

(RL) (I - R)hi / [I - (l-R)].

The meaning of the above solution equation is fairly simple given the equations
previously explained. To find Oti in the definitional equation, add an increment for the
defendant or subtract a decrement for the prosecutor from their previous counter offers. To
find Ou in the above solution equation, subtract from the defendant's bargaining limit or add
to the prosecutor's bargaining limit. In the solution equation, Ot0 - L is the distance to be
covered from the initial offer to the bargaining limit. It is a negative number for the defendant
and a positive number for the prosecutor. The I - R raised to the "ti" exponent indicates that
a smaller portion of that total distance to be covered is added as a positive or negative
increment to L at each successive ti stage. The 1 - R will always be a decimal smaller than 1,
and when a decimal smaller than 1 (unlike an integer) is raised to the exponent 3 (the third
time stage) the resulting decimal is smaller than when the decimal is raised to the exponent 2
(the second time'stage). For example, .7 squared is .49, but .7 cubed is only .34. the reason the
expression I - R is used rather than just R is because we are going backward from the
bargaining limit to O' rather than going forward from Oti., to 0 1
For further detail on solving difference equations, see BRENNAN, PREFACE TO
ECONOMICS 71-74, 238-40 (1973); C. DINWIDDY, ELEMENTARY MATHEMATICS FOR ECONOMISTS

199-216 (1967). For further detail on finding the sum of a geometric progression, see G.
MOORE, ALGEBRA

138-44 (1952).

4A possibly easier although normally less accurate and less informative way of arriving
at a general solution counter offer equation is to use the incremental or definitional equation
to calculate two counter offers along with the initial offer. The values of A and B are
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prosecutor's counter offer would be 4.61 or about 43 years. It is impossible
or at least very unlikely for the prosecutor to ask the defendant to go to jail
for 4 years when the defendant wants to go to jail for 5 years, or for the
defendant to want to go to jail for 5 years when the prosecutor is only
asking for 4! years. Therefore, the fourth stage is an unrealistic occurrence,
and convergence is likely to be at the midpoint (4.72) between the two third
45
stage counter offers of 4.88 and 4.56.
Using the static equilibrium approach, the settlement point was the
midpoint between the bargaining limits of the defendant (5.50) and the
prosecutor (4.34), namely 4.92. Which convergence point makes more sense,
the 4.72 or the 4.92? The 4.72 arrived at through the dynamic-equilibrium,
difference-equation approach makes more sense because it uses more
information, assuming, of course, that this information has some degree of
accuracy and is not mere random numbers. To arrive at a settlement
sentence, the dynamic equilibirum approach uses the bargaining limits, the
only information used in the static equilibrium approach, plus EF, R, and
the difference equations.
In discussing fyonvergence under the static equilibrium model 46 and
with regard to initial offers, 47 the discussion emphasized that when ALD is
greater than ALP, the defendant and the prosecutor should be able to agree
somewhere between those two limits, since they will then both be coming
out ahead of their fall-back positions. However, even if ALD is greater than
ALP, strong and persistent bluffing could lead to a break-off in negotiations in which both sides sacrifice the opportunity for a mutually beneficial
agreement. 48 This is more likely to happen if the negotiations involve
considerable emotion and name-calling, where a potential agreement
collapses because the parties feel that agreement with the other side under
such emotional circumstances involves losing face. This fear provides
further justification for encouraging the adoption of discovery procedures,
calculated in the regression equation Oti = A(t+l)B, where Oti is the counter offer at stage i,
and T is the stage number. For example, to fit such a power function to the defendant's
ascending staircase in FIGURE 2, the logarithms of 2.75, 3.58, and 4.16 as the dependent
variable scores and the logarithms of 1, 2, and 3 as the independent variable scores are fed into
the linear regression analysis. The computer output then informs us that the power function
which best fits the defendant's ascending staircase is Oti = 2.75 (T+l).S8. This equation tells us
that when T = 0, the initial offer will be 2.75; when T = 1, the first counter offer will be 3.58;
when T = 2, the second counter offer = 4.17; and when T = 3, the third counter offer = 4.66.
This third counter offer is slightly higher than the 4.56 calculated the more accurate way.
Applying the same method to the prosecutor's descending staircase we get the equationOui
8.70(T+ 1)--43. This approach to solving a difference equation is especially helpful if one
wants to know what the counter offer is at some time stage between the integer time stages as
might be the case in some other substantive problem. What we in effect are then doing is
approximating a solution for a differential equation which is generally even more difficult to
a difference equation where T must always take integer values.
solve than
45
See Section III-B4, infra, for a discussion of the logic behind finding convergence at
between the last two counter offers before the parties cross over.
the midpoint
46
See Section III-Al, supra.
4
7See Section III-B2(c), supra.
48
See Section III-B2(a), supra.

PLEA BARGAINING

1976]

29

which will enable both sides to have a greater awareness of what the
conviction probabilities and sentencing payoffs are likely to be, and to
thereby decrease the distrust and short-sighted emotion which may otherwise preclude effective negotiations.
Who won the plea bargaining contest? In a sense, both sides won. The
defendant won, since he was willing to go to jail for as long as 5.50 years,
but plea bargained a sentence of only 4.72 years. The prosecutor also won
since he was willing to let the defendant off with only 4.34 years, but
instead obtained a longer sentence of 4.72 years. 49 In a way, the defendant
won more, since the difference between 5.50 and 4.72 (.78) is larger than the
.38 difference between 4.72 and 4.34. On the other hand, the extent to which
the defendant or prosecutor won should probably be judged by limits the
defendant and prosecutor would have had if they had been omniscient
beings accurately perceiving PC and the payoffs cells. Judged by that
standard, the defendant may have been cheated because he set his limit too
high, or he may have enjoyed an unperceived windfall if he set his limit too
low. This is also true for the prosecutor. In another sense, the prosecutor
could be said to have won more than the defendant since he did obtain a
conviction. In that sense, the prosecutor won 4.72 years, and the defendant
lost 4.72 years, although that interpretation fails to recognize possible
opportunity costs to both parties with regard to what they could have had.
Who won thus depends on whether one talks in terms of a victory over
what could have been or whether one talks simply in all or nothing terms
of conviction or acquittal. The problem is largely semantic and psychological and is really not so relevant to analyzing the process of plea
bargaining.50
Rather than try to analyze who won or will win in a plea bargaining
situation, it is more meaningful to analyze or predict whether or not a plea
bargaining settlement will be reached. The circumstances that lead to static
equilibrium or disequilibrium have already, been discussed in terms of the
static model variables of payoff perceptions, probability conviction perceptions, and special types of defendants and prosecufors. 51 The subsequent
dynamic equilibrium model increases the understanding of when convergence will be reached by emphasizing the role of bluffing strategies, partly
manifested in exaggeration factors, and the role of gullibility or psycho19 If the defendant and the prosecutor are both considered to have won something, then a
Pareto optimum solution is obtained, since both sides won relative to their limits, or more
narrowly defined, no one lost relative to his limits and at least one party won relative to his
limits. If plea bargaining tends to produce such Pareto optimum solutions, it can be
considered a Pareto optimizing process.
0
The discussion focuses upon who won or lost when a plea bargaining settlement is
reached. The interesting question of who is likely to win and by how much if the case goes to
trial and sentencing is not discussed. See Part I, supra note 1, Section II-13 (on determining
the conviction probabilities of who is likely to win) & Section II-A2 (on determining the

payoff5 sentences).

'See Section III-A, supra.
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logical willingness to make big jumps in one's counter offers. As in poker
playing, these kinds of factors can cause a defendant or a prosecutor to
break off negotiations the way a poker player drops out of a hand, even
though convergence could have been reached given the respective bargaining limits of the parties.
The dynamic equilibrium material is also valuable for analyzing the
speed at which convergence will be reached since the speed of the process is
largely dependent on the exaggeration factors and splitting rates of the
parties. Convergence speed is also partly dependent on the proximity of the
parties' limits which are in turn influenced by their perceptions of PC and
the cell payoffs, not to mention their bonus and discount factors.
Nevertheless, if the limit of the defendant is only slightly higher than that
of the prosecutor, the parties will still not converge quickly if one or both
of them is prone to exaggerate or is very parsimonious about splitting the
difference between his last offer and his limit. This is especially the case if
the parties lack accurate information about the payoffs, the conviction
probabilities, and each others' likely limits. With more accurate information, gross exaggeration and unreasonable parsimony is less likely to be
pursued and less likely to waste the time of the bargainers and the criminal
justice system.
IV.

CIVIL ANALOGIES

A.

Out-Of-Court Civil Settlements

AND IMPLICATIONS

FOR POLICY AND RESEARCH

One useful way to review the mathematical model just presented for
handling the plea bargaining process is to apply it to the simpler situation
of out-of-court settlements in civil cases. Analyzing civil settlements and the
related literature may also help generate insights regarding policy variables
which by analogy could influence the likelihood of settlement in criminal
cases. Civil settlements are easier to analyze mainly for two reasons. First,
virtually all the goals of both the defendant and the plaintiff can be
measured in terms of dollars. Dollars represent a common unit that can be
added and subtracted even for different kinds of costs and benefits. Working
with dollars provides a more precise scale on which to position the costs
and benefits, and an easier method for obtaining meaningful data. A
second major reason why civil settlements are easier to analyze is that there
are only two sellers from which the defendant-buyer can buy or deal with
in a civil case. The defendant can either negotiate with the plaintiff or go
to trial. Pleading guilty before a judge is not a meaningful alternative for
the defendant in a civil case. If a civil defendant pleads guilty before a
judge, then the judge in a civil case can only find the defendant liable and
assess the damages for which the plaintiff asks. Only through (1) a bench or
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jury trial or (2) an out-of-court settlement can a damage figure be reached
52
other than the figure stated in the plaintiff's complaint.
1. From the Payoff Matrices to the Dynamic Equilibrium
In light of these two simplifying considerations, both sides are, in
effect, working with payoff matrices that only have a bottom or trial row,
i.e. that have only cells c and d present. Cell c represents the dollar amount
that the plaintiff is likely to receive if he goes to trial and does not win a
judgment in his favor, i.e. when PL = 0 where PL is the probability of
liability being established. Thus, cell c is zero dollars. Cell d represents the
dollar amount that the plaintiff is likely to receive if he goes to trial and
wins a judgment in his favor, i.e. when PL = 1.0. Cell d can be determined
using methods similar to those used in calculating cell d in the plea
bargaining situation.53 Thus, the payoff matrices in the civil situation
reduce to one row, because there is only one alternative to negotiation.
Indeed, the matrices reduce to just one cell, because one of the two cells in
that row will always be zero.
Given these simplified payoff matrices or simply the payoff amount
perceived by the defendant and the payoff amount perceived by the
plaintiff, a strategies graph like FIGURE 1 can easily be constructed. It
consists of only two fines. Both are trial lines starting at the zero origin. The
defendant's trial line slopes upward toward his perception of the payoff
amount, and the plaintiff's trial line slopes upward toward his perception
of the payoff amount. The'horizontal axis of the figure shows the perceived
probability that liability will be established, i.e. PL. Thus, the defendant's
unadjusted maximum bargaining limit is the point on his trial line at
which he perceives PL, and the plaintiff's unadjusted minimum bargaining limit is the point on his trial line at which he perceives PL. Good,
estimates of PL can be determined using methods like those discussed for
determining PC.54 Regardless of what PL is determined to be,. the
unadjusted limit of a party is calculated by multiplying his perceived PL
by his perception of the payoff amount. 55
To adjust the defendant's limit (LD), add a bonus factor. The bonus
factor (XD) consists of litigation costs (analogous to the criminal defen52
For further discussion of the application of mathematical modeling to out-of-court
civil settlements, see Note, An Analysis of Settlement, 22 STAN. L. REv. 67 (1969); Jolston &
Tersine, The Mathematical Evaluation of Trial versus Settlement, CAsE & COMMENT 3 (Jan.
1073) [hereinafter cited as Johnston & Tersine]; Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 399 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Posner]. For a good non-mathematical approach to civil negotiation, see H. Ross, SmTTLE
OUT OF COURT (1970).
53
See Part I, supra note 1, Section II-A2.
54
See Part I, supra note 1, Section ll-B3(a).
5
A strategies graph would look like the following for the unadjusted plaintiff's limits
and the unadjusted defendant's limits, using the hypothetical data of Section IV-A2, infra.
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dant's non-sentence goals which tend to turn him away from litigating)
minus settlement costs (analogous to the criminal defendant's non-sentence
goals which tend to turn him away from settling through plea bargaining).
Thus, as in the criminal situation, ALD or the adjusted limit of the
defendant equals LD + XD, but here XD nicely equals $L - $S, where $L is
litigation costs, and $S is settlement costs. To adjust the plaintiff's limit
(LP), subtract a. discount factor. As with the defendant, the discount factor
(XP) consists of litigation costs (analogous to the prosecutor's non-sentence
goals which tend to turn him away from litigating) minus settlement costs
(analogous to the prosecutor's non-sentence goals which tend to turn him
away from settling through plea bargaining). Thus, ALP or the adjusted
limit of the plaintiff equals LP - XP, where XP equals $L - $S of the
plaintiff.
As in the criminal situation, convergence is likely to be reached if and
only if ALD is greater than or equal to ALP. If, on the other hand, ALD is
less than ALP, then they will go to trial as the only alternative available,
unless at least one of the parties changes his adjusted limits.
The special equilibrium conditions shown in TABLE 2 with regard to
certain types of criminal defendants and prosecutors do not apply in the
civil case. This is so since there is only one alternative to negotiation,
namely going to trial. Thus, civil defendants and plaintiffs cannot be
divided into those who see alternative 1, alternative 2, or both alternatives.
However, the civil defendants and plaintiffs can be divided on the basis of
their degree of knowledge for determining the probability of liability being
established under the categories for certainty, ignorance, and risk. That
categorization, though, merely indicates that the party to which it applies
sees PL as being 0.0 or 1.0 if he is operating under certainty, as being .5 if
he is operating under ignorance with middling optimism-pessimism, or as
56
being something between 0.0 and 1.0 if he is operating under risk.
The dynamic equilibrium model is virtually the same for criminal or
6

6

5

5

Likely Damages
or Expected Value 3
in $1,000's
2
(without time
discounting)
1

01-11L

3

''-

2
1

ts1

0

0
0

.1

.2

.3

.4

.5

.6

.7

.8

Perceived Probability of Liability (PL)
6

5 See part I, supra note 1, Section II-B3.
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civil cases. As in criminal cases, the initial offer of the defendant represents
his adjusted limit minus an exaggeration factor. Similarly, the initial offer
of the plaintiff represents his adjusted limit plus an exaggeration factor.
From his low initial offer, the defendant proceeds upward by splitting the
difference between his last offer and his relatively high adjusted limit.
Likewise, from his high initial offer, the plaintiff proceeds downward by
splitting the difference between his last offer and his relatively low adjusted
limit. Once both sides come within the adjusted limits of the other side,
convergence is virtually assured.
2.

Time Discounting

The only complicating aspect of the civil model is the fact that the
monetary payoff amounts are generally received substantially into the future.
Therefore, they need to be discounted for the passage of time. In other
words, assume the average civil personal injury case in a big city like
Chicago takes five years to go to trial and to judgment. If the plaintiff is
offered $2,500 now, should he accept it? If he perceives PL to be .80 and the
judgment to be $5,000, then the $5,000 has an expected monetary value,
analogous to a likely or expected sentence in criminal cases, of $4,000 (.80
times $5,000). If the defendant's litigation costs are 40 percent of the
expected judgment of $4,000, and his settlement costs are 25 percent of the
judgment, 57 then $L - $S is $1,600 - $1,000. This means the adjusted
expected monetary value is $3;400, i.e. 4,000 -600. In other words, the
plaintiff's lower bargaining limit is $3,400. Without regard to time
discounting, he would thus reject the defendant's offer of $2,500.
The time discounting question, in effect, asks whether the $2,500 offer
is worth more or less than $3,400 expected value five years hence. It would
be helpful to know how much principal would have to be set aside at the
current annual rate of interest in order to have in today's money $3,400 five
years from now. Assuming the current interest rate is 6 percent and the
inflation rate is 4 percent, then the amount of principal is equal to $3,080,
i.e. $3,400/(l + (.06 -.04))- or algebraically P = A/(1 = (r - i))t, where A is the
future value or amount of the investment, r is the interest rate, i is the
inflation rate, and t, for time, is the number of years. In other words, the
plaintiff would have to be offered $3,080 now to be receiving the equal of
$3,400 five years from now. Since he is only being offered $2,500, he should
reject the offer.
Time discounting is also important to the defendant. For example, if
57

The main settlement cost is the one-third contingency fee that usually has to be paid to

one's attorney. It represents 33 percent of the settlement. If the expected judgment is higher
than the settlement, then 25 percent of the expected judgment might be about equal to 33
percent of the settlement. One often settles for less than the expected judgment in order to save
litigation costs which include: (1) the cost of having one's money tied up for a substantial
period of time, and (2) the' higher contingency fee percentage which personal injury lawyers
often charge for going to trial rather than negotiating an out-of-court settlement.
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the defendant is made a final settlement offer by the plaintiff of $3,080 the
defendant must decide whether paying the plaintiff $3,080 now will be
cheaper than paying the plaintiff $3,900 five years from now, assuming
$3,900 is the adjusted upper limit of the defendant.58 To determine which is
the better deal for the defendant, he must decide what is the value five years
hence of $3,080 paid out now. Assuming a six percent interest rate and a
four percent inflation rate, the future value for an investment of $3,080 in
principal is equal to 3,400, i.e..3,080 (1 + .02) 5 or algebraically A = P(l + ry.
In other words, the plaintiff's request for $3,080 now is the equivalent to
paying the plaintiff $3,400 five years from now. Since the defendant has an
adjusted upper limit of $3,900, the $3,400 figure is a good bargain for the
defendant.5 9
*The notion of time discounting does not apply to criminal cases in the
same way it does to civil cases because there is a much shorter passage of
time between the settlement negotiations and the subsequent trial (if there
is a trial) in a criminal than in a civil case. Civil cases also deal with money
damages (or injunctions against business practices which can be translated
into dollars) rather- than jail sentences, and the future value of money
compared to the present value can be more meaningfully measured than
the future and present value of jail sentences. The criminal defendant's
lowered bonus factor6 0 does take into consideration that a defendant might
be pushed toward going to trial and possibly appeal because he would
rather serve five years starting three years from now than four years starting
today. Similarly, the prosecutor may offer a bigger discount factor because
he would rather put the defendant in jail now, even if it is only a four-year
sentence, than put him in jail three years from now after a trial and
possible appeal even if the trial yields a five-year sentence. Thus, even in
58
The $3,900 ALD was arrived at by assuming the hypothetical defendant perceives the
payoff amount to be $4,500 if the case goes to trial. He also perceives PL to be .70, and thus
unadjusted limit is $3,150. We further assume his litigation costs if the case goes to trial will
be $1,200, and his settlement costs if the case is settled out of court will be $450. Thus, his
bonus 59factor is $750, and his adjusted limit is $3,900.
For further detail on time discounting, see C. DINWIDDY, ELEMENTARY MATHEMATICS
FOR ECONOMISTS 199-216 (1967); C. BELL geL. ADAMS, MATHEMATICS OF FINANCE 247-68 (1949).
The plaintiff and defendant need not operate under the same discount rate since they may be
able to obtain interest on their respective investments at different rates, and they may perceive
the inflation rate differently. Similarly, they need not perceive the interest rate or inflation rate
as holding constant in each future year. If X changes from year to year (where X =r-i), then
the formula for calculating P is P = A/(I+X-1) (l+X 2) . . . (l+Xn), and the formula for
calculating A is A =P(I+Xl) (I+X2) ... (I+X,) where the subscripts indicate the first year, the
second year, and so on. If the defendant were to offer the plaintiff a certain or varying amount
of income each year rather than a lump sum, the discounted present value would be calculated
by summing the quotient of each year's income divided by (l+(r-i))t-l, where t is one for the
first year, two for the second year, and so on. Such an offer is unlikely to be made by the
average defendant, but it is a common situation in benefit-cost analysis in deciding between
two or more social income producing governmental investments. See E. MISHAN, ECONOMICS

112-40 (1972).
HSee Part I, supra note 1, Section II-B4.
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the matter of time discounting, the criminal plea bargaining situation
involves more considerations which are difficult to measure and more
complexities than the civil negotiation situation. Nevertheless, worthwhile
insights can be acquired by applying elementary mathematical modeling to
both situations.
3.

The Decision to Sue and Other Analogies

Before getting to the plea bargaining stage, the prosecutor must decide
that he is going to bring a formal charge against the defendant. In a civil
case, that decision is analogous to the plaintiff's lawyer deciding that he is
going to file a formal complaint. It might be interesting to analyze briefly
the general considerations involved in deciding to initiate a civil lawsuit as
a grounds for better understanding the analogous considerations involved
in deciding to initiate a criminal lawsuit and for better understanding the
subsequent plea bargaining process.
In the simplest terms, a plaintiff should initiate a lawsuit if the
expected benefits of doing so will exceed the expected costs. The expected
benefits to the plaintiff equal the predicted damage award ($D) times the
probability of establishing liability (PL) minus one-third of $D times PL to
cover the lawyer's usual contingency fee. The expected benefits to the
plaintiff's lawyer equal one-third of $D times PL. The expected costs to the
plaintiff or the plaintiff's lawyer equal the amount of hours each one is
likely to have to spend pursuing the case multiplied by the value of their
time per hour, plus the out-of-pocket costs or other non-monetary expenses
involved in pursuing the case. The expected costs also include the cost of
the missed opportunities to do other more profitable things with one's time
where they cannot be simultaneously done. 61 Predicting damages that will
be awarded is analogous to predicting the trial sentence in criminal cases. 62
Determining the probability of liability is analogous to determining the
probability of conviction in criminal cases. 63
Applying these concepts to the prosecutor, one could say that a
prosecutor should initiate a lawsuit if the expected benefits of doing so *ill
exceed the expected costs. His expected benefits equal his predicted sentence
multiplied by the probability of obtaining that sentence either through
trial, a guilty plea without a bargain, or a guilty plea with a bargain. A
prosecutor generally prefers longer sentences to shorter sentences, since a
longer sentence tends to indicate that he has caught a more dangerous
61
For analyzing the decision to sue in civil cases, see R. HUNTING & G. NEUWIRTH, WHO
SuES IN NEW YORK CrrY?: A STUDY OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT CLAIMS (1962); F. MAC KINNON,
CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1964); Nagel, Statistical Prediction of Verdicts and
Awards, in MODERN USES OF LOGIC IN LAW 135 (Sept. 1963); Schwartz & Mitchell, An
Economic Analysis of the ContingentFee in PersonalInjury Litigation,22 STAN. L. REV. 1125

(1970). See also note 65, infra.
62See Part I, supra note 1, Section II-A2.
63
See Part I, supra note 1, Section

1-B3.
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criminal, and since the public seems to prefer longer sentences. Like the
plaintiff's lawyer in personal injury cases, the prosecutor includes, in his
expected costs, his time, expenses, and competing cases that cannot be
diverted. Unlike the plaintiff's lawyer, however, the prosecutor may be
operating under other constraints. For political and legal reasons, he often
must prosecute or formally charge many cases that are not profitable in a
benefit-cost sense, although he need not try the case since he still has
considerable bargaining discretion. Private defense counsel is more like a
private personal injury lawyer in being able to choose his clients. The
public defender is more like an insurance company defense counsel since
he is required to take all legally eligible cases, although with discretion in
out-of-court bargaining. 4
There are many other aspects of the decision-making activities of
lawyers in civil cases that are applicable by analogy to the decision making
activities of lawyers in criminal cases besides the settlement process, time
discounting, and the decision to sue. Just as one can gain insights into plea
bargaining from civil settlements, one can also gain insights into the civil
settlement process from analyzing plea bargaining. Thus, much of the
earlier discussion on plea bargaining is applicable by analogy to civil cases
although generally in a more simplified form. In addition, the model is
also applicable to civil cases by deducing the effects of various judicial
process changes on the likelihood and level of settlements being reached. 65
Similarly, suggestions for empirical research on testing hypotheses and
methodological tools concerning plea bargaining could also be applied to
66
research on out-of-court civil settlements.
B.

Practitioner and Policy Implications

1. Scholars, Lawyers, and Society
The main purpose of this article is to present a mathematical model
that captures the essence of the plea bargaining process in criminal cases.
The model presented should have value to legal scholars interested in why
the legal process operates the way it does. As such, the model can generate
hypotheses which can be empirically tested with data obtainable from
questionnaires, interviews, and court records. The model can also serve to
integrate related findings that have already been developed concerning the
nature of the legal process.
Although the main purpose is the development of conceptual, methodological, and causal theory, the model is also meant to be useful to
6For analyzing the decision-to formally charge in criminal cases, see F. MILLER,
PROSECUTION (1969); Abrams, ProsecutorialCharge Decision Systems, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1
(1975); McIntyre & Lippman, Prosecutorsand Early Disposition of Felony Cases, 56 A.B.A.J.
1154 (1970). The discretionary decision of private criminal defense counsel to accept a client is
discussed
in A. WooD, CRIMINAL LAWYER 96-101 (1967).
65
See Section IV-B, infra.
See Section IV-C, infra.

66
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practicing lawyers and legal policy makers. Practicing lawyers like states
attorneys, public defenders, and private defense counsel may find insights
in the model that will be useful to them in their plea bargaining activities.
In personal injury civil practice, there now exist looseleaf services and
mathematical how-to-do-it articles designed to aid plaintiffs lawyers and
insurance counsel in their negotiation activities. 67 Perhaps similar tools
will become available in criminal case work.
These looseleaf services may be expensive for some attorneys. It might
therefore be useful to determine how much they improve the accuracy of
the average practitioner in predicting the percentage of plaintiff victories in
one hundred cases and in predicting the mean amount of damages
awarded. If such a determination were made, one could then better decide
whether the extra accuracy is worth the extra cost. To determine how much
the defendant or prosecutor would benefit from the improved knowledge
gained from such a looseleaf service, one could calculate the absolute value
of S - S', where S is the predicted settlement sentence without the use of
those services, and S' is the predicted settlement sentence with the improved
knowledge. S equals (ALD + ALP')/2, where ALD' is greater than ALP',
and where ALD' and ALP' are the defendant's and prosecutor's limits based
on improved knowledge of the payoffs and of PC. These same calculations
can be used to help determine the extent to which the improved knowledge
increases the likelihood of settlement, as well as the accuracy of individual
68
practitioners.
If practicing lawyers in criminal cases can improve their bargaining
techniques through a better understanding of decision theory and equilibrium models, society will receive at least four kinds of benefits. First,
improving the effectiveness of the prosecutor is socially beneficial since he
represents society in the judicial enforcement of social norms. Second,
improving the effectiveness of public defenders and defense counsel is
socially beneficial to the extent that effective representation improves the
respect for the law of people accused of crimes. Many inmates object more
to how their plea bargaining was handled than to any other aspect of the
criminal justice process. 69 Third, improving the plea bargaining of both
the prosecutor and the defendant reduces the occurrence of under67

H. LIEBENSON & L. MILLER, MEDICAL AND LEGAL EVALUATION OF DISABILITY IN
PERSONAL INJURY CASES (1962); Hermann, Predicting Verdicts in Personal Injury Cases, 9
PRAC. LAW. 83 (1963); Johnston & Tersine, supra note 36; Reeder, Formulaefor Evaluationof

Damages, ABA LAw NOTES (Jan. 1967). The Verdict Expectancies looseleaf service of the Jury
Verdict Research Company provides probabilities of liability for a large variety of factual
situations. The ValuationHandbooks of the Jury Research Company and the CurrentMoney
Awards of the Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company provide expected damage award
payoffs68 also for a large variety of situations.
See S. RICHMOND, OPERATIONS RESEARCH FOR MANAGEMENT DECISIONS 540-56 (1968);
for a discussion of some of the mathematical considerations involved in determining the
incremental
value of additional information.
69
J. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 100-25 (1972); Blumberg, The Practiceof Law
as Confidence Game, 2 LAW & Soc. REv. 15 (1967); Stover S: Eckart, The Indigent'sRight to
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sentencing and over-sentencing. Both kinds of sentencing are socially
undesirable since under-sentencing may decrease the deterrent effect of the
law, and over-sentencing may generate unnecessary anti-social bitterness.
Both under-sentencing and over-sentencing can thus lead to an increase in
crime and crime costs. Fourth, saving time is important in the criminal
justice process, and improved plea bargaining may enable the prosecutor
and defense counsel to arrive at agreements more quickly.
2.

The Role of Discovery, Defense, Bail, and Delay ,

In addition to the direct practitioner and indirect social benefits, an
empirically valid plea bargaining model can also be useful for generating
ideas among policy makers with regard to (1) how to facilitate fair out-ofcourt settlements in criminal cases, and (2) the effects of other policies and
changes on the settlement process. If a legislature wants to encourage plea
bargaining in order to reduce court congestion, save money, and resolve
cases more quickly, the most meaningful policy reform that could be
adopted is probably the improvement of the criminal discovery process.
The model does indicate that if the defendant and the prosecutor are both
knowledgeable as to the true payoff cells and the true conviction probability, then they are quite likely to converge at a settlement point, because
(1) their unadjusted bargaining limits will then be equal, (2) the adjusted
bargaining limit of the defendant will increase in order to avoid the
defendant's litigation costs, and (3) the adjusted bargaining limit of the
prosecutor will decrease in order to avoid the prosecutor's litigation costs.
Through discovery techniques analogous to those used in civil cases, the
defendant and the prosecutor can become more knowledgable about the
available evidence, which is valuable in accurately determining the true
70
conviction probability and the sentencing payoffs.
Counsel (Mimeographed paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association
convention,
1973) [on file at the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL].
7
0These discovery techniques include requiring both sides to provide lists of witnesses in
advance, transcripts of confessions, itemized lists of materials obtained through search
warrants or other searches, and requiring both sides to answer questionnaire interrogatories
subject to the privilege against self-incrimination. Related techniques that have been used in
civil cases-to make both sides more knowledgeable and thereby facilitate settlements include
pretrial conferences and examinations by impartial medical experts and other experts.
On discovery in criminal proceedings, see R. NIMMER, THE OMNIBUS HEARING: AN
EXPERIMENT IN RELIEVING INEFFICIENCY, UNFAIRNESS AND JUDICIAL DELAY (1971); Symposium,
Pre-trial Discovery in Criminal Proceedings, 27 BROOKLYN L. REV. 318 (1961); Louisell,
Criminal Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent? 49 CAL. L. REV. 56 (1961). Providing more
discovery to both sides does not necessarily mean requiring pretrial conferences or omnibus
hearings. It would be wasteful to require discovery conferences in all criminal cases because
many would result in a non-negotiated guilty plea without necessitating such a conference,
and many might be unlikely to result in a negotiated guilty plea even with such a conference.
The only types of cases, if any, for which such conferences should be required are those that
have characteristics (possibly revealed at the preliminary hearing stage) that.are likely to
benefit from such a conference. Relevant characteristics might include the severity of the
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The model can aid the policy maker not only in stimulating ways of
facilitating settlements, but also in clarifying the impact on the settlement
process of policy and non-policy changes in the criminal justice system.
Two of the most important criminal justice policy changes in recent years
have been the increased availability of provided counsel to the indigent and
the increased release of arrested persons pending trial. Both of these reforms
have had the effect of reducing litigation costs for defendants. The bonus
factor will then be reduced, which in turn decreases the likelihood of
settlement: Free counsel clearly reduces litigation costs to the defendant
although there are two offsetting considerations. First, free counsel tends to
consist of a public defender who is pressed to settle because of his heavy
caseload and lack of financial and personal resources. Second, increasingly
expensive attorney fees for those who are not eligible for free counsel may
be increasing the settlement rate among non-indigent defendants.
Bail reform also reduces litigation costs because one of the defendants'
trial costs is the cost of having to remain in jail until trial while he is not
released on bond. That can be a high cost in terms of lost income and
discomfort that pushes jailed defendants toward settlement, i.e. offering a
larger bonus factor. That bonus element is no longer important when more
defendants are being released pending trial. Pointing out these effects of
providing free counsel and more liberal pretrial release in not meant to
attack those reforms. On the contrary, the purpose is to indicate that the
due process benefits the changes provide are partly offset by their settlement
reduction costs and to indicate a possible need for other policies, like
improved discovery techniques, to counteract that settlement reduction. It
should also be pointed out that although providing effective counsel and
pretrial release may decrease the likelihood of reaching a settlement, they
may cause the resulting settlement to be closer to the true sentence which
would have been given at trial since the defendant's artificially high bonus
7
factor is reduced. 1
An example of a non-policy change in recent years that has probably
affected the likelihood of plea bargaining convergence is the increased

initial charge and the initial offers, if any, by the prosecutor and the defendant. If the severity
is very low, the conference can be optional since guilty pleas are still likely to be high. If the
parties are very close on their initial offers they will probably reach convergence without a
compulsory conference; and if they are very far apart on their initial offers, a compulsory
conference will not be so likely to bring convergence.
"1See Section IV-B2, infra. Providing more counsel to the indigent and more pretrial
release decreases ALD, not only by decreasing the defendant's litigation costs, but also possibly
by decreasing the defendant's perception of his conviction probability and his sentencing
payoffs. Defendants are less likely to be severely convicted when they have a lawyer and when
'they have been released prior to trial so that they can better prepare their cases. The
prosecutor's perception of the conviction probability and the sentencing payoffs may also
thereby be decreased. This can result in a new midpoint between ALD and ALP that comes
closer to the "correct" sentence if by correct sentence one means that it is not influenced by the
discriminatory absence of defense couAsel and pretrial release.
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delay in processing criminal cases.7 2 This delay is due to increases in
population, crime rates, and urbanization although it is partly offset by
new court management techniques and new legal rules requiring speedier
trials. Long delay from arrest to trial increases the willingness of a defendant
to settle if he is held in jail pending trial. On the other hand, it decreases the
willingness of a released defendant to settle since a distant trial penalty is less
of an incentive to settle than one closer in time. Long delay, however,
may increase the prosecutor's willingness to settle since he has a difficult
burden of proof which generally becomes harder to meet as witnesses
become more forgetful or disappear. In anticipation of that happening,
the prosecutor tends to be willing to offer a bigger discount factor.
Given these conflicting effects of delay, it is hard to say how increased delay
affects cases in general. Specific cases categorized in terms of whether the
defendant is in or out of jail and whether the prosecutor is relying on
73
evidence that has a high or low time-decay rate may be better explained.
3.

Changes in Conviction Probabilities and Sentencing Payoffs

What does the model indicate about the effect of increasing or
decreasing PC or the cell payoffs on settlement likelihood? Clearly, if the
defendant is made to think PC or the cell payoffs are higher than they
really are, he will be more willing to settle. Likewise, if the prosecutor is
made to think PC or the cell payoffs are lower than they really are, he will
also be more willing to settle. As previously mentioned, however, they will
both be quite willing to settle if they simply perceive PC and the cell
payoffs accurately, rather than falsely upward for the defendant and
721 nstead of noting the effect of delay on the likelihood of plea bargaining settlement,
one might note that plea bargaining may be one of the causes of delay if continuances are
often required to allow plea bargaining to occur and a large percentage of plea bargaining

negotiations break down.

See Levin, Delay and Related Policy Topics in Five Criminal

Courts, (mimeographed paper presented at the American Political Science Association
convention, 1973) [on file at the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL]. That relation possibly further
emphasizes the need to facilitate convergence in plea bargaining by making both sides more
knowledgeable through discovery procedures.

Abolishing or restricting plea bargaining would normally increase delay in the criminal
justice system by increasing the number of trials. The amount of delay depends on the number
of trials, the number of persons available to try cases, and the average length of a trial. One
could thus offset the increased delay be increasing the number of persons available to try cases
or decreasing the average length of trial. The prosecutor could also offset the increased delay
by dismissing more cases. There may, however, be no increased trials or delay if the decrease
in plea bargains is offset by an increase in guilty pleas without a bargain out of fear that the
likely sentence on trial would be greater than the sentence following a non-negotiated plea:
That is what seems to have happened when plea bargaining was abolished in certain types of

cases in Phoenix, Arizona. Berger, The Case Against Plea Bargaining,62 A.B.A.J. 621 (1976).
7SFor further discussion on the role of discovery, defense, bail, and delay in determining
settlements, see Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & EcoN. 61 (1971)
[hereinafter referred to as Landes]. See also H. KALVEN, JR. & B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE
COURT 3 (1959); M.

ROSENBERG, THE PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND EFFECTIVE JUSTICE (1964);

Posner, supra note 52, at 399-458.
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downward for the prosecutor, since the defendant's bonus factor and the
prosecutor's discount factor will then put the defendant's bargaining limit
above that of the prosecutor.
What if the true PC increases or decreases from improved or worsened
investigative and presentation abilities by the prosecutor relative to defense
counsel, or from changes in the rules of evidence? FIGURE 1 helps answer
that question. It reveals that if both parties accurately perceive the same
true PC, the defendant's upper limit will be higher than the prosecutor's
lower limit without regard to that jointly-perceived true PC. The gap
between the defendant's upper limit and the prosecutor's lower limit,
however, is wider when PC equals 1.0 than when PC equals 0.0. That is
partly due to the relative payoffs of the defendant and prosecutor shown in
TABLE 1. If they both had the same payoffs, then they would have the same
limit lines, and they would be willing to set the same price at any jointlyperceived low or high PC. If, however, the defendant is willing to give a
smaller bonus at a lower PC, then he will be less willing to settle at a lower
PC. This, however, may be offset by the fact that the prosecutor is willing
to give a higher discount and more willing to settle at a lower PC. Thus,
improving or worsening the probability of conviction does not generally
affect the likelihood of a settlement being reached except in those situations
where the defendant perceives the payoffs as being higher than the
prosecutor does, (and settlement will thus be more likely at higher PC's), or
where the defendant increases his bonus more for a higher PC than the
prosecutor decreases his discount (and settlement will thus also be more
likely at higher PC's).
What if the true payoffs increase or decrease from more harsh or lenient
sentencing? FIGURE 1 is also helpful in answering the effect of that kind of
policy change. If sentencing became more harsh, the limit lines of both the
defendant and the prosecutor would still start at the zero origin on the left
vertical axis since the defendant would receive no sentence if he goes to trial
when his probability of conviction is zero. The limit lines of both parties
would, however, be higher on the right vertical axis. For example, those
intercept points are now seven and six for the defendant and prosecutor,
respectively, but with twenty percent harsher sentences they might become
about 8! and 7, respectively. Nevertheless, the parties would still be as
likely to reach a settlement, unless the defendant perceived the increase as
being substantially greater than the prosecutor (which would increase the
likelihood of settlement), or the defendant perceived the increase as
substantially less than the prosecutor (which would decrease the likelihood
of settlement). If FIGURE 1 were redrawn so that both parties initially
perceived the payoff cells alike and thus had the same limit lines, then an
upward or downward change in sentencing practices would simply cause
their common limit line to shift up or down without affecting the
likelihood of settlement, assuming they both accurately perceive the
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sentencing shift. The same results are true if changes in sentencing
practices affect only pleading before a judge, going to trial, or one of the
four cells. 74 This, however, assumes that the increase or decrease in
sentencing practices does not affect the relative size of the defendant's bonus
and the prosecutor's discount. The more severe a case, the less willing the
defendant might be to offer a large bonus for a plea bargaining settlement
and in effect plead for a long jail sentence; but this is offset by the possible
fact that the more severe a case, the more willing the prosecutor might be
to offer a large discount to avoid an expensive trial.7 5
74

Landes, supra note 73, at 69-71, however, states that the more severe a case is, the more
resources the defendant devotes to fighting the case, which decreases his PC and thereby
increases his willingness to go to trial and his unwillingness to agree to a plea bargain
settlement. That analysis, however, may fail to recognize that the more severe a case is, the
more resources the prosecutor devotes to fighting the case, which may restore the decreased PC
to where it was. Even if the prosecutor does not devote additional resources to the more severe
case, if he is a perceptive prosecutor, he will perceive that PC has gone down as a result of the
defendant's increased resources. The prosecutor's new lower PC will then result in a lowered
bargaining limit point for the prosecutor which will still enable a settlement to be reached.
This is so since LP will be equal to LD when both sides perceive PC and the payoff cells alike,
and ALP will be lower than ALD when the litigation costs are greater than the settlement
costs.
75

See Part I, supra note 1, Section II-B4. In Posner, supra note 52, at 421, however, the
writer says that if the stakes become higher in civil cases, the parties are less likely to settle.
The only example he gives is the addition of an interest rate percentage onto the damage
award rather than a fixed addition or subtraction. Thus, if in Posner's example, LD = $100,
LP = $120, then the initial gap is -$20. If six percent interest is added to each limit, then LD =
$106, LP = $127, and the new gap is a larger -$21. If, however, a $6 penalty had been added to
the damage award for delay rather than six percent interest, then LD = $106, LP = $126, and
the gap is still -$20.
More important, Posner assumes the perceptions (and thus the limits of the parties) are
unequal with LD being unrealistically lower than LP. If LD of $100 were equal to LP of $100
as in the perfect discovery situation, then after adding six percent interest, LD = $106, LP =
$106, and the gap remains the same. If, more realistically, ALD were to be $120 after the bonus
factor, and ALP were to be $100 after the discount factor, then the six percent interest would
make ALD = $127, ALP = $106, for a gap of $21 which is more likely to induce a settlement
since it allows more room for convergence than a gap of $20 when ALD is greater than ALP.
In other words, the bigger the gap, the less likely the settlement when ALD is smaller than
ALP; but the bigger the gap, the more likely the settlement when ALD is larger than ALP.
Posner also assumes that the likelihood of settlement is dependent only on the size of the
gap between the limits of the parties and nor on the gap ratio. Clearly, the size of the gap is
more important than the gap ratio in that the parties would be more likely to settle in case one
than in case two where in case one, LD = $10, LP = $11, the gap = -$1, and the gap ratio = .91
(or $10/$l1), and where in case two, LD = $1,000,000, LP = $1,100,000, the gap = -$100,000, and
the same gap ratio = .91. Nevertheless, if the gap is held roughly constant, the case with the
larger gap ratio is more likely to be settled such that case two is more likely to involve a
settlement than case three where in case three, LD = $1, LP = $100,001, the same gap =
-$100,000, but the gap ratio = .00001. In other words, in case two, the defendant-buyer can
come up to 91 percent of the plaintiff-seller's asking price; whereas in case three, the
defendant-buyer can only come up to 1/1000 of I percent of the plaintiff's asking price even
though in both cases they are $100,000 apart. This problem of the relative importance of the
gap and the gap ratio is related to the fundamental benefit-cost decision problem of the
importance of maximizing benefits minus costs (B-C) versus maximizing benefits divided by
costs (B/C), assuming both benefits an1 costs can be measured in the same units. Analogous to
the gap and gap ratio comparison, B - C is the preferable criterion; but if two investments are
equal on B - C, then one should prefer the investment with the higher B/C ratio. The above
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The above discussion of the non-effects of increasing PC or increasing
the likely sentences on settlement likelihood seems to run contrary to the
common sense notion that if PC and the likely sentences are increased, then
the defendant should be more willing to settle and avoid a likely conviction
carrying a stiff sentence. This common sense notion, however, assumes,
perhaps falsely, that the plea bargaining process on the part of the
prosecutor and the defendant fails to take into consideration the upward
shift in PC or in the likely sentences. In other words, to the extent that the
prosecutor and the defendant correctly perceive those upward shifts and
rationally incorporate them into their bargaining limits, then the results of
the plea bargaining will still be convergence, although at a higher sentence
than would otherwise be the case. This means the defendant would be no
more likely than before to reach a plea bargaining settlement, since such a
settlement will now mean a higher sentence. At the same time, however, he
will be no less likely to reach a settlement since the alternative sellers from
whom the defendant-buyer can buy have now also raised their prices. The
most important meaning of this analysis, though, is that rational plea
bargaining can just as capably produce meaningful sentences where the
parties accurately perceive PC and the sentencing payoffs as can the trial
process, although plea bargaining does so with less expenditure of social
resources.
The same kind of conclusion could have been reached by noting that
if PC and the likely sentences decrease, then the defendant will be less
willing to settle because the prosecutor cannot so effectively threaten him.
This conclusion, however, fails to consider that the PC reduction and
sentence reduction tends to get incorporated into the plea bargaining on
both sides, so that the parties are now logically bargaining between lower
limits. This means that the defendant will be no less willing than before to
reach a settlement, since such a settlement will now mean a lower sentence.
At the same time, he will be no more likely to reach a settlement, since
all the alternative sellers from whom the defendant-buyer can buy have now
also lowered their prices.
As a result, plea bargaining thus tends to result in sentences that reflect
the true probabilities of conviction and the true likely sentences, 76 provided
that:
examples could illustrate that principle by changing LP to B and LD to C. See R. MCKEAN,
EFFICIENCY IN GOVERNMENT THROUGH SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 25-49 (1958); E. MISHAN, ECONOMICS
FOR SOCIAL DECISIONS 134-35 (1972).
76
0ne might argue that even if plea bargaining could be made to arrive at sentences that
on the average equal those that would be arrived at through trials, the plea bargaining system
would still be defective for at least two reasons. First, plea bargaining does not give the
appearance of due process which a trial does. Therefore, defendants who are convicted by way
of plea bargaining might be more likely to have anti-social resentment. This is currently likely
to be so where defendants feel they are coerced into pleading guilty for lack of resources to take
cases to trial. If, on the other hand, public defenders have overly adequate resources,
defendants might feel they were getting such a break under the system that the system might
lose some of its deterrent power. Second, even if the plea bargaining averages equal the trial
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1. The parties are as capable as possible of accurately perceiving PC
and the sentence payoffs, which can be facilitated by better discovery
procedures and more objective sentencing.
2. The defendant is not forced to offer an excessive bonus (or any
bonus), which he otherwise might (a) if he were being held in jail pending
a distant trial, (b) if he could not afford an expensive lawyer and was not
eligible for a free one, or (c) if he has a public defender who does not have
the time or resources to take cases to trial where a trial would bring a lower
likely sentence than plea bargaining would.
3. The prosecutor is not forced to offer an excessive discount (or any
discount), which he might be forced to do if he did not have the time or
resources to take cases to trial where a trial would bring a higher likely
77
sentence than plea bargaining would.
averages, it would not be any consolation to tell an individual who receives an above-average
sentence in a plea bargain that someone else got an offsetting below-average sentence. What is
needed is to strive to have a system whereby every plea bargain, not just the average plea
bargain, equals the trial sentence. This means not only adequate resources for the defense and
prosecution, but also possibly pretrial discovery and flat sentencing, whereby both sides can
come close to predicting with certainty whether or not the defendant will be convicted and
with what
sentence.
77
For further discussion on the accuracy and fairness of plea bargaining, see AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY (1967); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS 42-65 (1973); D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION
OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 7-52, 231-43 (1966); Gallagher, JudicialParticipation
in Plea Bargaining: A Search for New Standards,9 HARV. C.R. - C.L. L. REV. 29 (1974); Kuh,
Balancingthe Scales of Justice: How to Make PleaBargainingWork, in THE NEW LEADER 10-

14 (Jan. 7, 1974).
The most practical sentence to arrive at in plea bargaining is for SO (the settlement
sentence) to equal PC' times d' where PC' is the true value of PC which would be 0.0 or 1.0,
and where d' is the true value of cell d. The value of PC' and d' cannot be known with
certainty before trial except by an omniscient being, but both values can be known after trial if
the case goes to trial. The SO will equal PC'd' if (1) the defendant, the prosecutor, and the
pleading judge perceive PC as PC'; (2) they perceive d as d'; (3) a = b = d, which means the
same sentence is given on plea as on trial; and (4) the defendant's bonus factor to be added to
LD equals the prosecutor's discount factor to be subtracted from LP. With these four
conditions, LS'i = c + (d-c)PC = 0 + (d' -0)PC' = PC'd', and LS2 = a + (b-a)PC = d' + (d' -d')PC'
= d'. Thus both LD and LP equal d' if PC' = 1, and both LD and LP equal 0 if PC' = 0.
Therefore, given those four conditions, SO = (ALD + ALP)/2 = PC'd'. The most ideal sentence
to arrive at in plea bargaining is PG times d' ', where PG is the true probability of actually
being guilty rather than just being convicted, and d' ' (d double primed) is the sentence which
is deserved in light of the crime and the defendant's characteristics (according to an
omnibenevolent being, a survey of public opinion, or whatever source one regards as
ultimate). The value of PC'd' can be objectively determined even before trial with some
statistical accuracy, see PartI, supra note 1, Sections II-A2, II-B3(a), but not the value of PGd".
The above symbolism is useful for obtaining a better understanding of the four roles
which Albert Alschuler perceives the prosecutor as having. Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole
in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Alschuler]. The four
roles include that of (1) the administrator who will settle for anything greater than ALP,
where ALP equals LP minus a large discount or %XP to avoid trial; (2) the advocate who will
try for a bargain as much greater than LP as possible, where LP equals LS, or LS2, whichever
is lower with no discount to promote administrative convenience; (3) the judge-like prosecutor
who strives for a settlement at what he perceives d' to be, or the true empirical value of cell d;
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By way of summary with regard to the effect of judicial system changes
on the likelihood of a plea bargaining settlement being reached and at
what level, one can say the following in light of the model presented:
1. A change that decreases the defendant's bonus factor (such as
increased free counsel or pre-trial release) will lower the defendant's
adjusted bargaining limit without affecting the prosecutor's limit. Thiswill narrow the room for settlement and lower the level of the new
settlement, assuming that a settlement can still be reached, and that it will
still be roughly at the mid-point between the defendant and the prosecutor's limits. The opposite occurs from a change that increases the
defendant's bonus factor. A prosecutor who is aware that a change has
occurred which decreases the defendant's bonus factor can offset the
decreased settlements by making better offers. He might especially want to
do that if the decreased settlements add to his court congestion and thereby
increase his desire to raise his discount factor.
2. A change that decreases the prosecutor's discount factor (such as
more resources to the prosecutor thereby in effect lowering the cost of
litigation) will raise the prosecutor's adjusted bargaining limit without
directly affecting the defendant's limit (although more resources to the
prosecutor may also affect the probability of conviction). This will have the
effect of narrowing the room for settlement and the effect of increasing the
level of the new settlement if one can still be reached. The opposite occurs
from a change that increases the prosecutor's discount factor.
3. A change that improves the ability of one or both sides to predict
more accurately the probability of conviction or the sentence 78upon
conviction (such as pretrial discovery proceedings or flat sentencing) will
and (4) the legislator-like prosecutor who strives for a settlement at what he perceives d' ' to be,
or the righteous normative value of cell d.
78Flat sentencing whereby the legislature removes judicial discretion to sentence after
conviction increases the predictability of all the cells in the decision theory matrix. Thus, if
the statute specifies a 10-year sentence for a given crime, then cells a, b, and d will all have 10's
in them, and cell c will continue to have a 0. Predictability may, however, be decreased in
some non-typical cases if the statute allows the judge to award probation as an alternative to
flat sentence; or if the judge or jury frequently refuse to convict in a trial because they consider
the flat sentence out of line with the nature of the circumstances.
An important effect of flat sentencing on plea bargaining would be a shift from
bargaining over sentencing recommendations to bargaining over the charge. Prosecutors may
not be so willing to reduce the charge if a reduced charge means a definite sentence reduction
as it does under flat sentencing, but as it often does not under indeterminate sentencing.
Another effect would be that going to trial would always be a more favorable alternatiVe than
a non-negotiated plea of guilty given the possibility of an acquittal. This might mean more
cases going to trial when plea bargaining breaks down than at present, although the extent to
which non-negotiated pleas provide an alternative to plea bargaining must be empirically
determined. The effect of practically abolishing non-negotiated pleas might cause the
prosecutor to be more willing to make concessions on the charge in order to (1) avoid trials,
(2) cover the non-typical case, and (3) relieve himself of the increased burden stemming from
more cases being thrown into lengthy plea bargaining because the defendant no longer has the
option available to him of a non-negotiated plea followed by a light sentence.
The prosecutor's bargaining position would mainly be strengthened and the
defendant's weakened if the new flat sentencing results in higher likely sentences than the old
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have the effect of increasing the likelihood of settlements by decreasing
misperceptions of their bargaining limits by the respective parties. In the
normal case, if both parties accurately perceive the probability of conviction and the sentences and thus have the same nonadjusted limits, then a
settlement should be reached when the bonus factor raises the defendant's
limit and the discount factor lowers the prosecutor's.
4. A change that increases the probability of conviction (such as more
lenient admissibility of police-obtained evidence) or that increases sentencing payoffs in any of the decision matrix cells (such as new mandatory
minimum sentences) will have the effect of raising both the defendant's
adjusted limit and the prosecutor's adjusted limit (if they both accurately
perceive the effects of those judicial system changes on PC and on
sentencing) since their respective limits at least partly reflect the product of
the perceived PC (or 1-PC) times the sentence associated with each decisionmaking possibility. The new limits will then still allow as much room for
settlement as before, but they will both be higher, thereby resulting in
settlement at a higher level. 79 A change that decreases the probability of
conviction or the sentencing payoffs will have the opposite effect.8 0
more indeterminate sentencing, or if the likely sentences are perceived as being higher by
defendants who may formerly have wishfully misperceived likely sentences as being lower
than they actually turned out to be. If the non-negotiated plea formerly provided a more
attractive alternative to the defendant (as it probably would if PC were high), then abolishing
it would strengthen and thereby raise the prosecutor's limit and weaken or lower the
defendant's limit. Thus, the effects of flat sentencing are more complicated than merely
improving the predictability of sentences by decreasing their variation. This is so in view of
the fact that the flat sentence level could conceivably be higher, lower, or at the same level as
the former sentence generally was or was perceived to be, and in view of the influence of the
level of PC on the impact of the sentence change on plea bargaining. In general, flat
sentencing provides for sentences that are substantially above the former average sentences, but
the flat sentences are subject to being reduced close to the average by reductions of one day for
each day of good time served in prison.
79Although the model enables one to determine the probable direction of the effects of
judicial process changes on the likelihood and level of plea bargaining settlements, one can
not determine the exact magnitude of such effects in an individual case because doing so
depends on the individual prosecutor, defendant, defense counsel, and case facts. However, the
magnitude of the effects on the average prosecutor of a given type, the average defendant of a
given type, or the average case of a given type can be discussed, at least after compiling further
empirical data. See Section IV-Cl, infra. One can also talk about certain judicial procedures as
being more or less conducive to increasing settlements than other judicial procedures such as
statements that there will be more settlements if pretrial detention averages six months than if
it averages three months and other things are held constant.
" 1Oaks and Lehman argue that "when the overall rate of conviction at trial goes down,
so would the proportion of guilty pleas." D. OAKs & W. LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JUsTcE SYSTEM
AND THE INDIGENT 57-58 (1968). Such reasoning seems to assume that a drop in PC only affects the
behavior of the defendant who now demands a lower sentence to reflect his lowered
bargaining limit. In light of the model and in light of the data presented by Oaks and
Lehman which they consider contrary to their above common sense, it seems reasonable to
expect that the prosecutor now offers a lower sentence to reflect his also lowered bargaining
limit. As a result, the percent of cases settled through plea bargaining should remain about the
same unless one side perceives the drop as being greater than the other side although the new
average sentences should now be lower. It is an empirical question as to which side, if either,
has a greater tendency to perceive a PC drop or a sentencing drop as being bigger although
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C.

Future Research
This article could conceivably lead to two kinds of future research. One
kind would relate to the plea bargaining model. The other kind would
involve applying the decision theory and equilibrium modeling concepts
and methods to other legal process and related problems.
1. Plea Bargaining Research
Future plea bargaining research can serve at least three useful purposes
with regard to the model presented. One purpose is to test the meaningfulness of the measuring instruments suggested in this article. The
measuring instruments include the methods for (1) deriving the payoff
matrices through questioning knowledgeable persons or analyzing case
data;8' (2) converting the payoff cells into relative or ordinal utility
measures;8 2 (3) determining conviction probabilities for specific cases or
types of cases;83 (4) obtaining an optimism-pessimism coefficient and
applying it to narrowing to a point the estimation range on PC or a payoff
cell;84 and (5) seeing if and how non-sentence goals can be meaningfully
reduced to a percentage against which the defendant's upper sentence
bargaining limit or the prosecutor's lower sentence bargaining limit can be
multiplied in order to determine the bbnus or discount factor.8 5
A second purpose of the testing is to determine the extent to which
various hypotheses directly generated by the model are true. These
hypotheses relate to the internal workings of the plea bargaining process.
They can be tested through depth interviewing or possibly through mailed
questionnaires that are carefully structured and directed toward prose86
cutors, defense attorneys, judges, or defendants in various places.
perhaps there is more of a knowledge lag on the part of less knowledgeable defense counsel
than there is on the part of prosecutors, who tend to be more full-time involved in criminal
work than the average defense attorney. This differential would explain why when PC went
down in the Illinois data, prosecutors made better offers resulting in a higher percentage of
bargained guilty pleas. In other words, given the small one-year time lag that Oaks and
Lehman looked at, there was insufficient time for the original percentage of settlements to
restore81itself as a result of defense counsel demanding better offsetting settlements.
See Part I, supra note I, Section II-A2.
82
See id. at Section II-AS.
83
Methods to be tested for determining conviction probabilities for specific cases or types
of cases might include the averaging of knowledgeable persons and the use of the three-point
estimate system. See id. at Section 11-B3(a).
84
See id. at Section II-B3(c).
8sSee id. at Section II-B4.
s6They include such statements as (1) pleading guilty before a judge produces a lower
sentence than being convicted at trial for the same crime, (2) pleading guilty before a judge is
used as an alternative to plea bargaining with the prosecutor, (3) defendants and prosecutors
have fairly clear notions of what the likely sentences are for going to trial and pleading when
the evidence is extremely weak or extremely strong, (4) defendants and prosecutors have fairly
clear notions of what the probability of conviction is under various circumstances, (5)
defendants perceive the likely sentences and conviction probabilities to be higher or maybe
lower than prosecutors do, (6) defendants and prosecutors have a number of other goals
besides sentence minimization and maximization respectively, (7) the non-sentence goals
pushing toward settlement are stronger than the non-sentence goals pushing toward
litigation, (8) the non-sentence goals vary with the severity of the case, the time discounting,
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A third purpose for future plea bargaining research relevant to the
model is to determine the extent to which various hypotheses indirectly
generated by the model are true. These hypotheses relate to the effect of
external policies, events, or changes on the plea bargaining process. They
require studying plea bargaining in different communities, in the same
communities over time, or in different cases using large random or matched
87
samples.
A purpose that cannot be served by empirical research like that listed
above is the testing of the basic assumptions of the model. This is so
because those assumptions are almost definitional tautologies. The basic
assumption in the model is that both defendants and prosecutors want to
and the risk-oriented personalities of the parties, (9) plea bargaining settlements occur in a
high percentage of felony cases, (10) defendants and prosecutors exaggerate their initial offers,
(11) defendants and prosecutors try to make the other side think the conviction probabilities
and the sentencing payoffs are lower or higher respectively than they perceive them to be, (12)
who makes the initial offer depends more on local custom than on which side has the greater
need to avoid trial, (13) counter offers of the defendant tend to move upward with bigger
jumps at first than later, (14) counter offers by the prosecutor tend to move downward with
bigger jumps at first than later, and (15) both the defendant and the prosecutor feel they have
gained something from a plea bargaining settlement over what they expected to get by going
to litigation in terms of sentence or non-sentence goals.
For examples of such survey research to determine average and deviant practices, see
Vetri, Guilty Plea Bargaining:Compromises by Prosecutorsto Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 865 (1964); Note, The Influence of the Defendant'sPlea on JudicialDeterminationof
Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204 (1956). In hypothesis 15 as elsewhere in this article, the concept of
"litigation" as an alternative to plea bargaining refers to going to trial, pleading before a
judge, or both, depending on what litigation alternatives are perceived as available to the
defendant.
87
These hypotheses include statements like (1) the presence of criminal discovery laws
facilitate plea bargaining settlements, (2) the increased availability of court-provided counsel
and pre-trial release have decreased settleftents, (3) increased delay in prosecuting criminal
cases increases settlements where evidence likely to decay is involved, but decreases settlements
where defendants are not in jail pendirig trial, and (4) changes in the conviction probabilities
or sentencing payoffs do not affect settlement rates.
For examples of such cross-sectional or over-time studies to determine relations
between practices and varying policies or environments, see Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole
in Plea Bargaining,36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50 (1968); Landes, supra note 73. In addition, see the
symposium on the comparative study of prosecutors in 5 THE PROSECUTOR 237 (1969).
Thomas Church and William Morris are developing an intensive study of the before
and after effects of the discontinuance of charge reduction plea bargaining in Oakland
County, Michigan, in which the sale of narcotics is first charged. Church & Morris, Charge
Reduction Plea Bargaining and the Courts: A Model Based on Quasi-Experimental Data
(unpublished papaer prepared at Oakland University, 1975) [on file at the INDIANA LAW
JOURNAL]. They plan on working with a probabilistic decision-theory model although like
most plea bargaining models, they do not consider the option of pleading guilty before a
judge without a negotiated bargain, the determination of the bargaining limits of the parties,
the dynamics of convergence, the occurrence of bluffing and other psychological elements, and
the difficulties in measuring subjective benefits rather than more objective sentences. Their
model like most models, however, will aid in generating hypotheses to test for and in
synthesizing the data which is compiled. Such an approach can be contrasted with a massive
compilation of raw data that has little theoretical direction for hypothesizing or integrating,
such as Miller, Dash, & McDonald, Plea Bargaining in the United States (funded LEAA
application prepared at Georgetown Law School, 1975) [excerpts on file at the INDIANA LAW
JOURNAL].
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maximize their satisfaction. This is almost a tautology, since one can define
satisfaction as what one receives when he chooses one alternative action
over another, given his values and the information he has available at the
time he makes the choice. Thus, even masochistic and martyr-prone
defendants seek to maximize their satisfaction, although they have an
unusual value system. Similarly, defendants who represent themselves
when they could have court-provided counsel are also seeking to maximize
their satisfaction although they may have a faulty information system
about the functions performed by defense counsel. At a less basic level, the
model assumes that the satisfaction of defendants will increase if their
sentences decrease, and the satisfaction of prosecutors will increase if the
sentences they obtain also increase, unless some offsetting non-sentence
goals are being achieved by the defendant or prosecutor. This assumption
is also practically a tautology, since the concept of non-sentence goals is
broad enough to include any unusual reason why a defendant would not
receive satisfaction from a lower sentence, or why a prosecutor would not
receive satisfaction from a higher sentence18
If defendants and prosecutors are assumed to want to maximize their
respective satisfactions, then this is- like saying they both are rational, or
not irrational, if "rational" simply means choosing the alternative action
that gives the most satisfaction given one's values and the information he
has available at the time he makes the choice. In this context being
"rational" does not necessarily mean being consistent in one's values,
informed of relevant information, intelligent in IQ or even capable of
functioning with psychiatric sanity. Laymen, however, often use the term
"rational" in these narrower senses which makes the term not as meaningful in decision theory as the phrase "wanting to maximize one's
satisfaction."8 9 In spite of the simplicity of our basic assumptions, they are
the only goal assumptions on which the essence of the plea bargaining
model is based.90 The calculation of limits like LD, LP, ALD, and ALP,
and the calculation of convergence points like S* are deduced from these
axioms or assumptions.
88

The model does not assume that it is possible for the defendant and the prosecutor to
bargain with each other since the model allows in Section II-B2(b), supra, for the possibility
that the defendant's only alternatives are trial or judicial pleading. On axiomatic theory or the
deduction of conclusions from empirical premises, see E. MEEHAN, CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL
THOUGHT 287-349 (1967); Bailey, Evaluating Axiomatic Theories, in SOCIOLOGICAL MErHODOLOGY 1970 (E. Borgatta ed. 1970); Land, Formal TheJry, in SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY
1971 (H. Cosmer ed. 1971).
8

90n rationality,

POLITICAL SCIENCE
90

see FRIEDLAND, INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT OF RATIONALITY IN

(1974).

1n addition to the above assumptions about the goals of the parties, certain given data
can be assumed (which are shown at the bottom of FIGURE 2) in order to provide a more
concrete illustration of the model. The given data, however, can be changed to any numbers,

and the conclusions of the model will still hold, especially with regard to the basic conclusion
that there will generally be convergence when and only when ALD is greater than or equal to
ALP.
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2.

Other Decision and Game Theory Applications
Perhaps the most important value the presentation of this plea
bargaining model might have is to stimulate the application of decision
theory and equilibrium modeling to legal and political problems other
than plea bargaining. Decision theory and equilibrium models are not easy
to find in the literature on legal policies and the legal process. That may,
however, only reflect the newness of these approaches rather than reflect
adversely on their applicability.
Probabilistic decision theory, i.e. decision theory under uncertainty,
seems to be especially applicable to many of the fundamental decisional
problems in the legal process. These include analyzing the behavior of
judges in the context of (1) deciding whether to release an arrested person
pending trial or confine him to jail by setting a bail figure higher than he
can meet, or (2) deciding whether to imprison a convicted defendant or to
allow him freedom on a suspended sentence or probation. In the bail
context, there are two alternative decisions comprising the rows of four-cell
payoff matrix, namely release the defendant or hold him in jail pending
trial. The key probabilistic event is the probability of the defendant failing
to show up for trial. 9 If the probability is zero that the defendant will fail
to show up, meaning that it is virtually certain he will appear in court,
then the worst payoff is received if the defendant is held and the best payoff
if he is released. If the probability is 1.0 that the defendant will fail to show
up, then the next to the best payoff is received if he is held and the next to
the worst payoff if he is released. 92 The order of those payoffs might be
changed by one who has less concern for freeing the non-wrongdoer, i.e. for
9SPretrial release statutes specify that the main criterion for release is the probability of
appearance. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, § 110-2; FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(c). The model,
however, can also consider the probability that the defendant will commit a crime while
released,2 as is discussed in note 93, infra.
9 For a discussion of how to work with payoff matrices that involve ranking or ordinal
data like the above-mentioned pretrial release matrix rather than interval data like otir plea
bargaining likely sentences matrix, see J. WILLIAMS, THE ComPLEAr STRATEGYSr 198-206
(1954). If as mentioned above in discussing the pretrial release matrix, cell c is worst, a is best,
d is good, and b is bad, then those cells can be given rank-order payoff scores of c = 1, a = 4, d =
3, and b = 2. The two-alternative payoff matrix can be graphed where line one or LPI = a + (ba)PS = 4 - 2 (PS), and line two or LP2 = c + (d-c) PS = 1 + 2(PS). The LPI is the likely payoff
from holding the defendant; the LP2 is the likely payoff from releasing the defendant; and PS or
just P is the probability of skipping out. Such a strategies graph like FIGURE 1 would involve
intersecting pairs of lines. The point of intersection or PS* is (as in FIGURE 1) the point where
LP1 = LP2 or 4 - 2(PS) = 1 + 2(PS). Solving for PS in this equation gives a PS* of .75. This means
that given those cell payoffs, one should release anyone whose PS is below .75 and hold anyone
whose PS is above .75. This decision theory analysis would reflect community values even more
so if the payoffs were based on a survey, and if the respondents were allowed to indicate relative
or interval differences between the cell payoffs rather than just rank orders. Additional data
gathering can indicate what percentage of the defendants in a given city fall below PSO or above
PS'*, and what percentage of the defendants are actually released or actually held. The
important matter to note, however, is that one does not need to work with absolute units like
sentence years or dollars in constructing payoff matrices, but instead can work adequately with
relative units or index nurmbers.
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93
freeing someone who will violate his promise to show up in court.
Probabilities of skipping out could be obtained for individual defendants or types of defendants. 94 Payoff values could also be calculated
through a survey of relevant persons. The payoff values produced by the
survey could be expressed as index numbers or relative distances rather than
as absolute units like prison sentences or dollars. The decision theory
methodology could be used to determine for any given case or type of case
whether the defendant should be released or held in jail. 95 The decision
would depend on whether the expected value of release is greater or less
than the expected value of holding the prisoner, by calculating for each
case or case type: a(1-P) + b(P) versus c(1-P) + d(P), where P is the
probability of skipping out, and a, b, c, and d are the cell payoffs
analogous to those in TABLE 1.
If case data is available that closely approximates the data in a given
city, an average city, or a type of city, the above decision theory analysis
may well result in an extremely low percent of cases in which defendants
should be held in light of the probabilities of skipping out and in light of
the cell payoffs perceived by the respondents. If so, this might indicate that
more arrested persons should be released, or that more arrested persons
should be held if the optimum release percentage shown by the decision
theory analysis is substantially higher than the actual release percentage.
Such a decision theory analysis may also provide insights into the value
structures and probability perceptions of arraigning magistrates, regardless
whether the decision theory model is close or far from the actual release
percentage. A similar analysis could be made of the incarceration/
probation decision, except that the key probabilistic event would be the
likelihood of the defendant repeating his crime.
Probably the most useful application of the bargaining aspects of
decision theory, besides criminal and civil settlement negotiations, is in
obtaining a better understanding of certain aspects of contract law. The
traditional common law of contract tended to operate on the assumption
that (1) the buyer sought to maximize the gap between his upper
bargaining price and the settlement price with no conflicting goals, (2) the
seller sought to maximize the gap between the settlement price and his
lower bargaining price, and (3) both parties had perfect information. The
courts refused to interfere with contractual arrangements, arguing implicity
or explicitly that buyers and sellers under such assumptions would both
benefit from the equilibrium agreements that would be freely determined.

93As a supplement to the payoff matrix with the probability of skipping out as the key
contingent event, one could also have a payoff matrix with the probability of committing a
crime (while released) as a second contingent event. This would mean that for a defendant to
be released, his probability of skipping out would have to be below PS* (i.e. the intersecting
probability of skipping out discussed in note 92, supra) and PW* (i.e. the intersecting
probability of criminal wrongdoing where PWO is calculated in a manner similar to PS*).
94
See Part I, supra note 1, Section lI-B3(a).
95M.
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Clarifying those assumptions through geometric and algebraic bargaining
theory should help clarify defects in the assumptions and the adverse effects
they can produce. Such recognition has led to increased government
regulation of contracts dealing with employment, landlord-tenant relations, consumer purchases, and other matters on behalf of the party who is
likely to have less information and who is more likely to be influenced by
non-economic goals. Even when the assumptions are accurate, the analysis
has helped illustrate the need for increased governmental intervention to
prevent the parties from contracting to the detriment of the community
through such matters as the building of a glue factory in a residential
neighborhood or the non-reconstruction of a strip niine. The analysis
should also illustrate the method for restoring in a meaningful way the
parties to the position where they would have been in a freely negotiated,
fully informed agreement which one side has breached. 96
Closely related to the two-person bargaining in contract law is the
multiple-person bargaining associated with coalition formation within
collegial courts. This is one area of decision-game theory that has been well
developed in the political science literature. Some political scientists have
analyzed how the nine judges on the Supreme Court come together in
majority and minority coalitions. For example, Glendon Schubert hypothesizes certain goals that each judge or group of judges might have in
coalition formation. He then observes their behavior to see if it fits the
hypothesized goals. If the behavior does fit the goals, he considers that as
providing support for the accuracy of the hypothesized goals, although the
behavior could be directed toward other goals or the goals could be
achieved by other behavior. If the behavior does not fit the goals, Schubert
considers that as a rejection of the hypothesized goals. Although the judges
may really have those goals, they may be unable to behave accordingly,
because they may misperceive factual means-ends relations or because they
97
may have other conflicting goals.
Walter Murphy, on the other hand, has been among those seeking to
explain the dynamic bargaining process which is present on the Supreme
Court, although he uses a verbal approach rather than a quantitative one.9
96
See Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: The Geometry of
Contract Law 1969 DUKE L.J. 49 (1969). See also Birmingham, Legal andMoral Duty in Game
Theory: Common Law Contract and Chinese Analogies, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 99 (1969);
Birmingham, A Second Look at .the Suez Canal Cases: Excuse for Nonperformance of
Contractual Obligations in the Light of Economic Theory, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1393 (1969).
97
See G. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 173-269 (1959);
Schubert, The Study of JudicialDecision-Makingas an Aspect of PoliticalBehavior, 52 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 1007, 1022 (1958); Schubert, Policy Without Law: An Extension of the
Certiorari
Game, 14 STAN. L. REV. 284 (1962).
1
sSee MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964); Danelski, The Influence of the
Chief Justice in the Decisional Process of the Supreme Court, in MURPHY & PRITCHETr,
COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS 525 (1974); Murphy, Marshaling the Court: Leadership,
Bargaining, and the Judicial Process, 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 640 (1962).

1976]

PLEA BARGAINING

53

David Rohde has shown particular concern for testing hypotheses that
relate to the size of the winning coalition in the sense that anything more
than 5/9 or 56 percent represents possible waste with regard to what
judicial principles could have been established, unless an image of
unanimity was being sought. 99 Sidney Ulmer has developed a number of
formulas for analyzing the relations between coalition size and the
likelihood of error, which has important policy implications for the issue
of what minimum size coalition should be allowed for jury convictions. 00
3. Other Equilibrium Modeling Applications
Mathematically, equilibrium models involve two or more simultaneous
equations or inequalities that intersect when graphed in such a way that
the points of intersection repesent the points toward which the behavior of
an individual or individuals tends to move. In that sense, probabilistic
decision theory is a type of equilibrium model since the intersection or
intersections of the highest or lowest payoff lines are points where one's
strategy should change from one alternative decision to another. Twoperson bargaining and multiple-person coalition models are thus also
equilibrium models since they often hypothesize a point toward which the
bargainers gravitate or a point that represents a kind of natural coalition
like the minimum winning coalition. The most common equilibrium
models in elementary economics are the supply and demand model, the
consumer model, and the firm model. All three have numerous potential
applications to legal policy problems. 01'
The supply and demand or market model says that there are two
simultaneous equations which determine the equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity in a competitive market. One equation shows quantity
demanded as a function of price, and the other equation shows quantity
supplied as a function of price. Where those two equations intersect is
where the prevailing price and quantity bought and sold will tend to be.
This is so because at any higher price suppliers will supply a larger
9
See Rohde, Policy Goals and Opinion Coalitionsin the Supreme Court, 16 MIDWEST J.
PoL Sci. 208 (1972); Rohde, A Theory of the Formation of Opinion Coalitions in the U. S.
Supreme Court, in PROBABILITY MODELS OF COLLECTIVE DECISION-MAXING (R. Niemi & H.
Weisberg eds. 1972). Rohde draws heavily upon W. RiKFR & P. ORDESHOOK, POSrrTvE
POLITICAL THEORY (1973) and W. RIKER, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COALITIONS (1962).
10
See ULMER, COURTS AS SMALL AND NOT So SMALL GROUPS (1971); Ulmer, Quantitative
Analysis of Judicial Processes: Some Practical and Theoretical Applications, 28 LAW &
And Then There Were None: The Diminution of
CONTEMP. PROB. 164, 176 (1963); Zeisel ....
the Federal Jury, 38 U. CHi. L. REV. 710 (1971). Political scientists have also studied such
matters as the measurement of cohesion in judicial coalitions, the extent towhich judges with
similar background characteristics tend to be in the same coalitions, and the measurement of
the pivotal power or other power indices of coalitions. Much of this literature is reviewed in
the first Ulmer article above. Most of it, however, does not contain a bargaining element or a
deductive mathematical model like that associated with decision-game theory.
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quantity than buyers will buy, and suppliers will thus lower their selling
price to sell the surplus. At any lower price buyers will demand a larger
quantity than suppliers will supply, and buyers will thus raise their buying
price to encourage more production. This model can be used to get a better
partial understanding of how the salaries of legal process personnel like
judges, prosecutors, and public defenders are determined. Those salaries
may in turn have a substantial influence on the quality of legal process
personnel. This model can also be used to get a better partial understanding of the market price for prostitution, gambling activities, stolen
goods, hired killers, and other criminal services. Indeed, a whole school of
criminology may be in the process of developing which emphasizes that the
way to decrease crime is to increase the costs of committing crimes,
including the missed opportunity costs (i.e. shift the supply curve to the
left so that at a given price, less will be supplied because of higher costs),
and decrease the benefits which cause people to demand or seek criminal
activities, i.e. shift the demand curve to the left so that a given price, less
10 2
will be demanded because of lower benefits from the product.
The consumer model says that the consumer is in optimal equilibrium
when the marginal benefit-cost ratio of every product that he buys is equal
to the marginal benefit-cost ratio of every other product that he buys. The
marginal ratio of a product or good is the ratio of the benefit to be received
from buying one additional unit to the cost to be paid for that one
additional unit. If the marginal benefit-cost ratios are not all equal, th~n
the consumer should buy more of those products which have higher
marginal or incremental ratios and less of those products which have lower
ratios. This model applies to many legal policy problems where one is
seeking to get an optimum mix among a variety of goods. 10s All of these
optimum mix situations involve somewhat difficult problems in measuring
benefits or satisfaction and measuring costs or effort. The measurement
methods however, may be less difficult than those involved in measuring
101For materials which deal with multiple applications of economic modeling to law, see
G. BECKER & W. LANDES, ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT (1974); G.
TULLOCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAW (1971). For those who think they need an introduction to or
review of basic economic models of the market, the consumer, or the firm, see any elementary
economics textbook such as P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS (1972).
02See R. ANDREAS & J. SIEGFRIED, THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME (forthcoming); L. KAPLAN,
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CRIME (1976); A. ROGERS, THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME (1974); G.
TULLOcx, THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME (forthcoming); THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND

(S. Rottenberg ed. 1973); Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. oF. POL. ECON. 169 (1968).
103Examples include finding an optimum mix between (1) law reform and case handling
in the OEO Legal Services Program, (2) free press and fair trial in prejudicial pretrial press
reporting, and (3) voting, schools, criminal justice, housing, public accommodations, and
employment civil rights activities in promoting equality improvement. See S. NAGEL,
PUNISHMENT

MINIMIZING COSTS AND MAXIMIZING BENEFITS IN PROVIDING LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR

(1973); S. NAGEL & M. NEEF, THE APPLICATION OF MIXED STRATEGIES (1976); Nagel, Reinbolt,
& Eimermann, A Linear ProgrammingApproach to Problems of Conflicting Legal Values
Like Free Press Versus Fair Trial, 4 RUTGERS J. OF COMPUTERS AND THE LAW 420 (1975).
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the plea bargaining cell payoffs, the conviction probabilities, and especially
the non-sentence goals.
The model of the firm says that a one-product firm is in optimal
equilibrium such that its total profits will be maximized when its marginal
revenue equals its marginal cost. Marginal revenue or benefit is the
additional unit of income which comes from producing one additional
unit of the firm's product. Marginal cost is the additional unit of cost
which comes from producing one additional unit of the firm's product. If
marginal or incremental revenue were greater than marginal cost, then the
firm should keep producing more units of its product, because more
income than cost has been produced from each additional unit. If marginal
revenue were less than marginal cost, then the firm should cut back on the
number of units it produces because at least the last few units have been
costing more to produce than the revenue they generate. This equilibrium
model may have more applicability to legal policy problems than any of
the previous equilibrium models. It could help provide a better understanding of what is involved in finding the optimum level of due process to
produce in criminal and civil cases. The optimum level would be the point
where the marginal cost of convicting the innocent, which can be
considered a negative benefit or negative marginal revenue, equals the
marginal cost of acquitting the guilty. This same firm model could also
help provide a better understanding of what is involved in finding the
optimum level of severity for economic regulation laws, divorce laws, and
other substantive laws. The optimum level would be the point where the
marginal cost of being under-severe (which is like negative marginal
revenue) equals the marginal cost of being over-severe. 04
As with the plea bargaining model, one may have to resort to nonprecision forms of measurement in order to apply the model of the firm,
the consumer, and the market to legal policy problems. Even then,
however, these models can be insight-provoking. They provide insights for
comparing optimum or equilibrium behavior with empirical behavior so
that one can make policy recommendations to bring the empirical closer to
the optimum, or so that one can revise the values he attributes to the policymakers in order to bring the optimum closer to the empirical. They provide
insights for understanding the effects on other variables of changing legal
policies and decisions, and the effects on legal policies and decisions of
changing other variables. They help to clarify assumptions, goals, alternative means, payoffs from alternative means, contingent probabilities, and
other elements essential to understanding more fully the basic simplicities
and subtle complexities of law and the legal process.

104S. NAGEL, P. WIcE, & M. NEEF, THE POLICY PROBLEM OF DOING Too MucH OR Too
LITTLE (1976); R. RIDKER, ECONOMIC COSTS OF AIR POLLUTION (1967); Posner, supra,note 52.

[Vol. 52:1

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
APPENDIX

SYMBOL

Parties:
D
P
Defendant's
Alternatives:
Alt. #1 or T
Alt. #2 or J
Alt. #3

Payoff Cells
a

Utility Units:
DIS
SAT

1: GLOSSARY OF SYMBOLS

REPRESENTS

The defendant or defense
counsel
The prosecutor

Defendant goes to trial
Defendant pleads guilty before
a judge without a bargain
Defendant settles with the
prosecutor
Coin flip or other random
method to determine whether
defendant goes to trial or
pleads before a judge
Method of non-bargain
resolution (trial or nonnegotiated plea)
Cell showing perceived
sentence if defendant pleads
guilty when probability of
conviction is low
Cell showing perceived
sentence if defendant pleads
guilty when probability of
conviction is high
Cell showing perceived
sentence if defendant goes
to trial and is acquitted
Cell showing perceived
sentence if defendant goes to
trial and is convicted
True value of cell d known
only to an omniscient being
Sentence which is deserved by
the defendant in light of his
characteristics and in light of
the crime
Dissatisfaction units or negative
satisfaction units in a payoff
cell, not just sentence years
Satisfaction units in a payoff
cell, not just sentence years

SECTION
FIRST APPEARING

I-Al
I-Al

II-Al
I-Al
II-Al

III-A2(b)
II-A2

II-Al

II-Al
II-Al
II-Al
IV-B3 (note 77)

IV-B3 (note 77)

II-A3
I-A3

1976]
Probabilities:
PC
PC,
PCD
PCP
PG
PL
PS

Threshold
Probabilities:
PC*

PS*

PW*

Sentences and
Settlements:
LS

LS,
LS2
LS*

R

PLEA BARGAINING
Perceived probability of defendant
being convicted
True probability of conviction
as known by an omniscient
being
Probability of conviction as
perceived by the defendant
Probability of conviction as
perceived by the prosecutor
Probability of whether or not
the defendant is actually guilty
Perceived probability of liability
being established in a civil suit
Probability of defendant skipping
if released

The probability of conviction
on trial that makes going to
trial or pleading guilty without
a bargain seem like equally
desirable alternatives
The probability of a released
defendant showing in court that
makes holding or releasing him
prior to trial seem like equally
attractive alternatives
The probability of a released
dffendant committing a wrong or
a crime that makes holding or
releasing him prior to trial
seem like equally attractive
alternatives

Likely sentence in years or
expected sentence value from
either trial or a non-negotiated
plea
Likely sentence from going to
trial
Likely sentence from a nonnegotiated plea
Likely sentence at the point
where going to trial or pleading
without a negotiated bargain are
equally attractive alternatives
Result of clash between defendant
and prosecutor

II-Al
II-Ba(a)
II-B3(a)
II-B3(a)
II-B3(a)
IV-Al
IV-C2 (note 92)

II-B2(c)

IV-C2 (note 92)

IV-C2 (note 93)

II-Al
II-B1
II-B1

II-B2(c)
III-A2(b)
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Likely settlement at the point of
equilibrium or the convergence
point between the adjusted limits
of the defendant and prosecutor,
where defendant's limit is higher
than the prosecutor's
The true settlement as known to
an omniscient being
Bonus Factor,
Defendant:
XD

%XD

Discount Factors,
Prosecutor:
XP

%XP

Bargaining Limits:
ALD
ALP
L
LD
LP

Defendant's bonus factor in
bargaining to be added to the
defendant's unadjusted bargaining
limit to obtain ALD
Defendant's percentage bonus
factor to be multiplied by the
defendant's unadjusted bargaining
limit to obtain XD

Prosecutor's discount factor in
bargaining, to be subtracted from
the prosecutor's unadjusted
bargaining limit to obtain ALP
Prosecutor's percentage discount
factor to be multiplied by a
prosecutor's unadjusted bargaining
limit to obtain XP

Adjusted bargaining limit of the
defendant
Adjusted bargaining limit of the
prosecutor
Bargaining limit for the
defendant or the prosecutor
Defendant's unadjusted bargaining
limit
Prosecutor's unadjusted bargaining
limit

Attitudes of Bargainers:
M
Middling attitude on the
optimism-pessimism scale
O
Optimistic attitude
O-P coefficient
Optimism-Pessimism coefficient
on a 0 to 1.00 scale
P
Pessimistic attitude
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III-Al(b)
IV-Bl

II-B4(b)

II-B4(b)

II-B4(b)

II-B4(b)

II-B4(b)
II-B4(b)
III-B3(b)
Il-BI
II-Bl

III-A2(a)
III-A2(a)
II-B3(c)
III-A2(a)
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Exaggeration Factors
EFD
[he fraction less than one by
which the defendant multiplies
is adjusted limit in order to
arrive at an initial offer
The number more than one by
EFP
which the prosecutor multiplies
his adjusted limit in order to
arrive at an initial offer

III-Bl

III-Bl

Offer (Symbol can be
preceded by a D or a P):
.. o1

Splitting Rates:
R
RD

RP

Time Designation:
t

n
T
Benefits and Costs:
B
B/C ratio
C
$L

S

Initial offer, or offer at time 0
First counter offer
Subsequent bargaining offers
Counter offer at any time i or
at any stage
Counter offer of any previous
stage, or time i minus one
time unit
Splitting rate for the defendant
or the prosecutor
Splitting rate in defendant's
bargaining, or the fraction of
the distance between his last
offer and his bargaining limit
Splitting rate in prosecutor's
bargaining, or the fraction of
the distance between his last
offer and his bargaining limit
Time (used as a subscript like
i and n)
Time point i or stage i
corresponding to any stage
The last time point
Stage number from 1 to N
(used as a variable)
Benefits
Benefit/Cost ratio
Costs
Litigation costs in a civil suit
Settlement costs in a civil suit

Discounting Future
Value of Settlements:
A
Amount or future value of a
future payoff

III-B1
III-Bl
III-Bl
III-B3(b)
III-B3(b)

III-B3(b)

III-Bl

III-Bl

III-B1
III-B3(c)
III-B3(c) (note 44)
III-B3(c) (note 44)
IV-B3 (note 74)
IV-C3
IV-B3 (note 74)
IV-Al
IV-Al

IV-A2
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Principal or present value of a
future payoff
Interest rate of an investment
minus the inflation rate

IV-A2
IV-A2

Variables, Types of:
X
Independent variable used to
predict from
Y
Dependent variable to be
predicted to

II-BI

Regression Coefficients:
A or a
Value of the variable being
predicted to when the variables
being predicted from have zero
values in a linear or log-linear
relation
B or b
Ratio between a change in the
variable being predicted to one a
one-unit change in the variable
being predicted from, holding
other variables constant

II-A2

Miscellaneous:
CS
P
P2

Measure of crime severity based
on sentences provided in the
statutes
Proportion of all cases which go
to trial
Proportion of all cases which
plead guilty before a judge
without a bargain

II-B1

II-A2

II-A2
Footnote 34
Footnote 34
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2:

BAsIC FORMULAS USED

(1) Expected values (or likely sentences associated with each choice)
LS2 = (1-PC) (a) + (PC) (b)
LS 2 = a + (b-a)PC
LS, = (1-PC) (c) + (PC) (d)
LS1 = c + (d-c)PC
(2)

Non-adjusted bargaining limits
LD or LP = LSI or LS2 , whichever is lower

(3)

Adjusted bargaining limits
ALD = LD + XD
ALP = LP - XP

(4)

XD = (%XD
XP = (%XP

* LD)
* LP)

Likely settlement
S- = .5 (ALD + ALP)

(5) Threshold PC and LS (where either going to trial or pleading guilty without
a bargain is equally attractive)
PC* = (a-c)/(a-b-c+d)
LS* = (ad-bc)/(a-b-c+d)
(6)

Offers
(a) Initial offer
DOt0 = EFD * ALD
P0 1 = EFP ° ALP
(b) First counter-offer
O, = O0, + RD(ALD-Ot0)
Oa = O, - RP(Oto-ALP)
(c) General counter-offer in terms of prior counter offer
Oti = Oa.1 + R(L- Ot.. )
(d) General counter-offer
in terms of initial offer
Oti = L + (l-r)ti (O,0 - L)

(7)

Present value in time discounting
P = A/(I+R)t

